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INTRODUCTION
The recent debate between those who oppose the current trend of expanding the 
duration and breadth of copyright control over creative works, and those who welcome it, 
has focused on large and abstract questions like the optimal duration of copyright,2
whether extension of subsisting copyrights is constitutional, 3 the degree to which 
technology has either facilitated or inhibited control of copyrighted content,4 and the 
effect that such control has on free speech, the public domain, and future creativity.5  The 
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debate has produced an insightful literature, and a few creative (but thus far unsuccessful) 
lawsuits.6  It has not, however, substantially altered the direction of recent developments 
in the law, which continues to move in the direction of increased control.  
This article presumes that the trend toward greater control will continue.  I will argue, 
however, that a few relatively modest and realistically implementable changes to the 
copyright laws could help address the legitimate concerns of the copyright critics. 
Curiously, it is relatively small changes to copyright procedure, and not to the substantive 
rights granted by copyright, that may allow the law to reach this desirable end. 
Copyright formalities. For most of our history, Congress’s copyright law has 
included a system of procedural mechanisms, referred to as “copyright formalities”, that, 
as will be shown in greater detail, helped to maintain copyright’s traditional balance 
between providing private incentives to authors and preserving a robust stock of public 
domain works from which future creators could draw.  From the first copyright statute in 
1790, Congress required that authors register their copyrights, give notice (by marking 
published copies with an indication of copyright status such as the “©” symbol, as well as 
other information about copyright ownership), and (perhaps most importantly) renew 
their rights after a relatively short initial term by re-registering their copyright.  Failure to 
comply with these requirements either terminated the copyright (renewal) or prevented it 
from arising in the first place (registration and notice).  
Taken together, these formalities created data about the existence and duration of 
copyright for the work in question, and about who owned the copyright.  Formalities also 
facilitated licensing (by lowering the cost of identifying rightsholders), moved works for 
which copyright was not desired into the public domain, and encouraged the use of public 
domain works (by lowering the cost of confirming that a work was available for use).  
Deformalizing copyright.  However, in a process that began in earnest with the 
Copyright Act of 19767 and that culminated in successor legislation like the Berne 
Convention Implementation Act8 and the Copyright Term Extension Act,9 Congress 
pared back and, in some instances, entirely discarded copyright formalities.  Under 
current law, copyright arises the moment an original piece of expression is fixed in a 
6
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Colo. Complaint filed Feb. 18, 2003) (available at 
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Ashcroft, No. C04-01127 BZ (N.D. Cal. Complaint filed Mar. 22, 2004) (available at 
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“tangible medium of expression”.10  Registration and notice, though encouraged,11 are not 
required as a condition of protection.  Renewal is gone altogether.      
Beginning in 1976, then, the U.S. moved from a “conditional” copyright system that 
premised the existence and continuation of copyright on compliance with formalities, to 
an “unconditional” system, in which a reduced set of voluntary formalities plays only a 
minor role.  Richard Epstein has aptly characterized these changes as “copyright law . . . 
flipping over from a system that protected only rights that were claimed to one that vests 
all rights, whether claimed or not.”12  That is a fundamental shift in any property rights 
regime, and one that, in the copyright context, represented a break with almost two 
centuries of practice.  The advent of unconditional copyright has nonetheless generated 
little comment in the academic literature—perhaps because the very term “formalities” 
signals that the former requirements were trifling, ministerial, or more bothersome than 
helpful.  To the extent the issue has been discussed at all, commentators have generally 
approved the trend13 as a necessary predicate to U.S. accession to the Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.14  The Berne Convention is the most 
significant international copyright treaty, and it includes a provision prohibiting 
signatories from imposing copyright formalities as a condition to the protection of works 
of nationals of other member states.15
Reformalizing copyright.  This paper lays out a scheme for “reformalizing” 
copyright—i.e., for moving copyright back to a conditional regime—but in a way that 
accounts for developments in technology and that allows the U.S. to remain in 
compliance with its undertakings in the Berne Convention.   
10
 17 U.S.C. 102.
11
 See infra at text accompanying notes ____.
12
 Epstein, supra note ___, at 124.
13
 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg & John M. Kernochan, One Hundred and Two Years Later: 
The U.S. Joins the Berne Convention, 13 Colum.-V.L.A. J. Law & the Arts 1 (1988); 
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.01[B][1][a] 
(2000) (Berne’s “enlightened approach to copyright protection is notable for its antipathy 
to formalities . . . .”).  But see Lessig, Free Culture, supra note __, at 250 (“Rather than 
abandoning formalities altogether, the response [of the Berne drafters] should have been 
to embrace a more equitable system of registration.”).
14
 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris Act, July 24, 
1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (hereinafter “Berne Convention”).  All citations 
to the Berne Convention are to the “Paris Act”, adopted on July 24, 1971, unless noted 
otherwise.  The Paris Act, to which the United States acceded on March 1, 1989, is the 
currently effective text of the Berne Convention.
15
 Berne Convention, art. 5(2).
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Part I of this article describes the conditional copyright regime that characterized U.S. 
law for almost two centuries, and explores the role that formalities played in maintaining 
copyright’s traditional balance. 
Part II sets out the consequences of our post-1976 move away from conditional 
copyright and toward an unconditional system.  In this part, I argue that formalities 
served an important role in filtering out of copyright works for which exclusive rights are 
not expected to provide a benefit to authors, thereby focusing copyright protection on 
works for which exclusive rights could be expected to add to the inducement to creative 
effort that is the primary justification for copyright.  
The removal of formalities has had a profound effect on the nature and reach of U.S. 
copyright law.  In fact, although the lengthening of the copyright term has attracted 
significant attention, and the removal of formalities almost none, the latter arguably 
represents the more significant change to the law, both in terms of expanding the domain 
of copyright beyond works for which application of the law is useful in inducing 
investment in creative works, and, consequently, in reducing copyright’s social utility.  
It is nonetheless still probably true that the elimination of mandatory formalities, at 
least in the particular forms that the law imposed before 1976, made sense given the 
circumstances (principally the need to gain admission to the Berne Convention) that 
faced Congress at the time.  Very quickly, however, those circumstances have changed.  
The growth of the Internet, and, more broadly, of digital technologies, has opened up new 
possibilities for public access to and use of creative works that did not exist when 
Congress was removing formalities from copyright law.  Before the digital age, the cost 
of copying and distribution had more effect on the ability of most people to access, use, 
and transform creative works than did the copyright laws.  But now, digital distribution is 
cheap, and digital copying essentially free.  Today, copyright law has emerged as the 
principal barrier to the creative re-use of a large amount of already-existing material that, 
under the former conditional copyright regime, would not have been subject to copyright 
in the first place.  The majority of creative works have little or no commercial value (and 
the value of many initially successful works is quickly exhausted).  For works that are not 
producing revenues, continued copyright protection serves no economic interest for the 
author.  But in an unconditional copyright system, commercially “dead” works are 
nonetheless locked up: they cannot be used as building blocks for (potentially valuable) 
new works without permission, and the cost of obtaining permission will often prevent 
use.  In such instances, copyright is radically unbalanced: its potential benefits are 
depleted, and it therefore imposes only social costs.  
In Part III of this article, I explore how reformalizing copyright might restore the 
balance between incentives and access that the old conditional system maintained.  The 
article does not, however, argue for the unilateral U.S. re-adoption of old-style 
formalities—such a move would fail because, among other reasons, it would cause the 
U.S. to fall out of compliance with the Berne Convention, thereby removing the U.S. 
from the international copyright system.  Part III offers two alternative paths to 
reformalization:  
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The Reciprocity Principle. The most direct route is to change the Berne Convention 
to permit—but not require—Berne nations to re-formalize their domestic copyright laws 
(and to apply those formalities to foreign as well as domestic works).  Toward that end, I 
propose a revised text of the Convention that removes Berne’s current prohibition of 
formalities.  In place of the previous ban, the revised Berne Convention would adopt a 
“reciprocity principle” requiring that all Berne jurisdictions that impose formalities (1) 
permit foreign authors to comply with formalities in their national laws by complying 
with formalities either in their home country or in the work’s country of first publication 
or registration; and (2) adhere to a set of standards set out in Berne that are designed to 
make different countries’ formalities “interoperable”.  
These relatively small changes to Berne could, if properly implemented, support a 
system that allows authors (or publishers) to comply with formalities in every Berne 
Union nation simply by complying with formalities in their home country.  Thus Berne 
nations would realize the benefits of reformalizing their domestic law, without creating 
significant transaction costs that would deter rightsholders from publishing their works in 
multiple jurisdictions.     
New-Style Formalities. It may be, however, that changes to the current text of the 
Berne Convention are not possible in the near term.  That should not cause us to give up 
on formalities.  Rather, that should lead us to ask whether we can formulate a set of 
“new-style” formalities that would capture as many of the benefits of the former system 
as possible, while not depending for their effectiveness on forfeiture of copyright.  If 
formalities of this type could be reintroduced into U.S. law, they would nudge our 
copyright system back toward its utilitarian past while preserving our place in the 
international copyright system.  
Toward that end, I propose a system of formalities that, although nominally 
voluntary, are de facto mandatory for any rightsholder whose work may have commercial 
value.  Non-compliance with the new-style formalities I propose would subject works to 
a perpetual and irrevocable compulsory license, with royalties set at a very low level, thus 
effectively moving a work into the public domain.  Although compulsory licenses are 
often criticized on the ground that they demand that a price be set for the rights at issue 
without a market mechanism to do so, the compulsory licenses that would be 
implemented in a set of new-style formalities would not be susceptible to this criticism.  
Rather than setting a price for the rights in a copyrighted work, these licenses would 
merely establish a threshold—i.e., that the rights were valuable enough to merit the 
relatively trivial investment required to comply with formalities.  
As this paper shall argue, such a system of new-style formalities would replicate the 
important work that our pre-1976 conditional copyright system was able to do: namely, 
filtering commercially valueless works out of copyright and focusing the system on those 
works for which it could potentially do some good.  Additionally, as we shall see, it is 
unlikely that a set of new-style formalities based on compulsory licenses would run afoul 
of the anti-formalities provision of the Berne Convention.        
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I. THE TRADITIONAL CONTOURS OF “CONDITIONAL” COPYRIGHT
A.  Formalities in the Early Copyright Statutes
Viewed from the perspective of our current law, where copyright arises the moment a 
piece of creative expression is fixed in a tangible medium,16 the early U.S. copyright laws 
are remarkable for the variety of hurdles that an author was made to clear to gain and 
maintain the protection of the law. The Copyright Act of 1790,17 the first statute enacted 
under the authority established in the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause,18
granted rights only to U.S. authors (and their executors, administrators and assigns) 
limited to the “printing, reprinting, publishing and vending” of their maps, charts, and 
books.19  And the term of protection was quite short: the term of copyright in 1790 Act 
was 14 years, with a 14-year renewal if the author survived to the end of the initial 
term.20
Most importantly for present purposes, the 1790 Act also required compliance with a 
fairly demanding series of formalities, both as a condition precedent to receiving
copyright protection, and then as a pre-requisite to maintaining protection past an initial 
term.    
First, the 1790 Act conditioned protection on the author’s registration of his work 
with the clerk’s office of the district court where the author resided.21  The registration 
condition applied to all works—even those previously copyrighted under pre-1790 state 
16
 See supra at text accompanying note __.
17
 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (the “1790 Act”).
18
 U.S. Const. art. I, s 8, cl. 8.  This clause is often referred to as the Patent Clause, the 
Copyright Clause, or the Intellectual Property Clause.  Although the term “intellectual 
property” was unknown at the time of the Constitution’s framing, and although the 
concept of intellectual property covers more ground than just patents and copyrights, I 
have chosen the third formulation to refer to the congressional power in this article, 
because it is the only formulation that captures in compact language both types of 
exclusive rights authorized in the clause.    
19
 The 1790 Act gave authors no exclusive right to derivative works, or to public 
performance or display of their works.
20
 1790 Act § 1.
21
 Id. at § 3.  
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copyright law.  These works were required to be re-registered in order to gain federal 
protection.22
Second, within two months thereafter, the author was required to give notice  of his 
copyright by publishing proof of registration in a newspaper for at least four weeks.23  In 
1802, in an enactment described as “supplementary” to the 1790 Act, Congress required, 
in addition to newspaper notice, that any author seeking to obtain copyright “give 
information” by marking each copy of his work with a prescribed copyright notice.24  The 
statute required the same proof of registration published in the newspaper notice to be 
inserted in all published copies of books “at full length in the title- page or in the page 
immediately following the title.”  Marking according to the prescribed form was also 
required on all charts and maps.  In all cases, the information required included the 
identity and location of the author, and the date of copyright.25
Third, the author was required to deposit a copy of the work, within six months of 
publication, with the Secretary of State.26
22
 See William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension, and the Copyright 
Law of 1790 in Historical Context, 49 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 1021, 1023 (2002).  
Interestingly, Maher’s examination of bibliographic records from the period 1790-1800 
reveals that only 12 works subject to pre-existing state copyright law were re-registered 
under the 1790 Act—a tiny fraction (1.74%) of the works registered during that period.  
Id. at 1025.  Moreover, at the time of their re-registration, only 3 of the works dated from 
before 1784.  Id.  Although 9 of the 12 states that had copyright laws prior to 1790 
required works to be registered as a condition of protection, most of the state registration 
records from this period have been lost and it is, therefore, impossible to say how many 
works were registered under state copyright and were eligible for re-registration under the 
1790 Act.  See G. Thomas Tanselle, Copyright Records and the Bibliographer, 22 Studies 
in Bibliography 77, 82-84 (1969).  Nonetheless, the very low absolute number of works 
re-registered following the 1790 Act (i.e., re-registration of works that were previously 
subject to state copyrights that were preempted by the 1790 Act) is consistent with much 
more expansive recent data, discussed infra at text accompanying notes ____, showing 
that copyrighted works have, on average, a short commercial life before their value is 
fully depreciated.
23 Id.
24
 2 Stat. 171 (1802).
25
 Id. at § 1.
26
 1790 Act § 4.  Responsibility for accepting registration and deposit was later moved to 
the Librarian of Congress, see 16 Stat. 212, §§ 85, 109-110 (1870).
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Fourth, as previously mentioned, a surviving author was permitted to renew the 
copyright for an additional 14 years.  Renewal required the author to re-register the 
copyright, and to publish proof of re-registration in a newspaper.  Both actions were 
required to be taken within the final six months of the first term.27
Given the complexity of these formalities, the cost of compliance was not trivial, and 
the consequences of noncompliance severe.  Failure to comply would result either in 
copyright failing to arise (registration), being unenforceable (notice, deposit), or subject 
to early termination and entry of the work into the public domain (renewal).    
Thus, at its inception the American copyright system required compliance with a 
series of formalities that included registration, deposit, and notice via both marking and 
published announcement.  The system also demanded re-registration (renewal) as a pre-
requisite for enjoyment of the full term of protection—a term which, it should be added, 
was very short judged from the perspective of today’s extended copyright terms.  
This emphasis on formalities established in the Founders’ copyright statutes stayed 
almost entirely intact through the revisions of the copyright law enacted in 183128 and 
1909.29  The 1831 Act extended the initial term of copyright to 28 years,30 but kept the 
registration, deposit, and notice requirements of the 1790 Act,31 as well as the 
requirement that copyright owners renew their copyright to secure the benefits of a 
second term.32  And in a supplemental enactment in 1834, Congress strengthened the 
registration requirement by requiring, for the purpose of maintaining an accurate record 
of copyright ownership, the recordation of “all deeds or instruments in writing for the 
transfer or assignment of copyrights.”33  The penalty for failure to record a transfer within 
60 days was, as with noncompliance with any other formality, severe: the transfer would 
be judged “fraudulent and void against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for 
valuable consideration without notice.”34
27
 1790 Act § 1.
28
 4 Stat. 435 (1831) (the “1831 Act”).
29
 35 Stat. 1075 (1909), codified as 17 U.S.C. 1 et seq (repealed 1976) (the “1909 Act”).
30
 1831 Act §15, 4 Stat. 439.
31
 Id. at §§ 3-5, 4 Stat. 437-48.
32
 Id. at § 2, 4 Stat. 436-37.
33
 An Act providing for the recordation of assignments of copyrights, 4 Stat. 728 (June 
30, 1834).
34
 Id.
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Like the 1831 Act, the 1909 Act retained the registration,35 notice36 and renewal37
requirements—though it lengthened the renewal term from 14 to 28 years38 and softened 
the registration requirement somewhat.39  And there copyright came to rest, until its 
major revision—and the beginning of the move from conditional to unconditional 
copyright—in 1976.  
B.  From Conditional to Unconditional Copyright
Our former conditional copyright regime extended copyright protection only to those 
who took affirmative steps to claim copyright protection by registering their work, 
depositing it, marking it with notice of copyright, recording transfers, and renewing their 
rights at the end of an initial term 
In contrast, our current unconditional copyright regime grants copyright protection to 
all “fixed” creative works, whether or not the author or his assigns takes any affirmative 
steps to claim copyright protection.  Unconditional copyright grants protection whether or 
not the work is registered, deposited, marked, renewed, or assignments of the work 
recorded.  In each instance, protection is automatic and indiscriminate, regardless of the 
will of the author or his assigns.
Beginning with the Copyright Act of 1976, which repealed the 1909 Act, we have 
moved quickly from a conditional to an unconditional copyright system.  Today we have 
a statute that is unconditional.  It grants copyright to all creative works at the moment of 
their fixation.  Registration, deposit, notice and recordation, which used to be mandatory 
formalities, are now voluntary; noncompliance no longer affects the validity of the 
35
 1909 Act § 1.
36
 Id. at §§ 10, 19-21.
37
 Id. at § 24.
38
 Id.
39
 The 1909 Act allowed protection to attach upon “publication or the work with the 
notice of copyright . . . .”  Id. at § 10.  Following publication, however, the Act required 
that the author “promptly” deposit copies of the work with the Copyright Office, and 
authors were required to submit an application for registration along with the deposit.  Id. 
at § 13.  Failure of an author to complete registration and deposit had severe 
consequences.  First, the author was debarred from bringing a lawsuit for infringement of 
the copyright until he had complied with the registration and deposit formalities.  Id.  
Second, the Register of Copyrights was authorized to make a demand for deposit, and 
failure to promptly comply (within three months from any part of the United States 
except for “outlying territorial possessions”, and within six months from anywhere else) 
would result in fines and the voiding of the copyright.  Id. at § 14.     
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copyright.  Lengthy copyright terms are granted to all works.  Renewal is not required as 
a predicate to enjoyment of the full term.   
1. Voluntary Registration and Notice
Of course, formalities have not disappeared entirely: current law relies on voluntary 
formalities and offers significant inducements to compliance.  Registration creates a 
presumption of “constructive notice” that a work is under copyright,40 which is very 
useful to a plaintiff in an infringement action.  More broadly, registration is a pre-
requisite to the initiation of an infringement action,41 at least for works of U.S. origin.  
(Because a flat ban on enforcement of an unregistered copyright was believed to violate 
the Berne Convention,42 there is no registration prerequisite to bringing suit for 
infringement of a work of foreign origin.)  Current law also limits recovery of statutory 
damages and attorney’s fees to instances of infringement occurring after registration43
and disallows the defense of innocent infringement for works imprinted with notice of 
copyright.44  The law provides a somewhat weaker scheme to incent voluntary 
recordation of transfers of copyright ownership—recordation of transfers creates a 
presumption of constructive notice, but is not a pre-requisite to an infringement action 
and failure to record does not limit infringement damages.45
However substantial these inducements may be for owners of valuable copyrights 
who foresee the possibility of infringement litigation, they are not a replacement for 
mandatory formalities.  The current system of voluntary formalities creates no incentive 
for compliance for the large number of rightsholders who do not expect their works to 
produce significant revenue: for these rightsholders, any disadvantage that 
noncompliance may create in infringement litigation is irrelevant.  
Data on the rate of copyright registration confirm what logic suggests.  Figure 1 
graphs the annual number of registrations for the period 1910-2000.46
40
 See 17 U.S.C. 410(c).  
41
 17 U.S.C. 411.  
42
 See Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne 
Convention, 10 Colum.-VLA J. L. & Arts 1, 60-61 (1986).
43
 17 U.S.C. 412.
44
 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. 401(d).
45
 See 17 U.S.C. 205.  The law continues to require deposit, but punishes failure to 
comply with a fine, rather than with forfeiture of the copyright.  17 U.S.C. 407(d).
46
 Landes & Posner, supra note _, at 236.
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[INSERT as FIGURE 1 graph from L&P]
This graph, which has been taken from a study by William Landes and Richard 
Posner of United States Copyright Office data, shows that the gross number of 
registrations had been increasing sharply from the end of World War I through 1991.  
After 1991, however, the number of registrations stabilizes at a level approximately 20% 
lower than that reached in 1991, despite very significant growth in the overall economy 
between that year and 2000 (a rate of growth that doubtless was mirrored, if not 
exceeded, by the increase in the nation’s “expressive output”).47  So the number of 
registrations should have continued to grow after 1991, perhaps at an even greater rate 
than it had in the prior decades, yet the number dropped in 1992 and has failed to increase 
since.   
Some portion of these missing registrations is comprised of authors who, because 
they see no realistic prospect of commercial return from their works and do not foresee 
infringement litigation, are not moved by the law’s current inducements to register.  
Under the pre-1976 conditional copyright system, these works would have moved 
immediately into the public domain, where they were usable without the need to ask 
permission, and could potentially serve as building blocks for future works that might 
find commercial success.  In our post-1976 unconditional regime, however, many of 
these works are effectively dead.  They are copyrighted, and therefore are usable only 
with permission.  But the cost of obtaining permission is far from trivial.  The would-be 
user first must locate a rightsholder, and then negotiate for rights.  The cost of negotiating 
a license may be high when neither the licensor nor the licensee has any information from 
other market transactions that would help establish the value of a license.  But many 
would-be users will never even get to the negotiation stage—the cost of identifying 
rightsholders, without the benefit of a registry, and often without any reliable indication 
of current ownership from the work itself (either because the work is not marked with 
notice or because rights have been transferred without recordation), will often be enough 
to deter the use.  
Perhaps the best illustration of the difficulties users face in identifying rightsholders is 
the admission of the major record companies in the Napster litigation that they were 
unable to produce a complete list of the copyrighted works they claimed to own.48   If 
record companies that are supposed to be sending out royalty checks are unable to 
quickly and cheaply identify their own works, the overall cost to users of doing so, 
especially in the case of works that are not commercially successful, is likely to be 
substantial.  Indeed, it is not surprising that the record companies apparently invest so 
47
 Id. at 235.
48
 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp.2d 896, 925 (N.D. Cal. 2000) 
(record companies contend “it would be burdensome or even impossible to identify all of 
the copyrighted music they own”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 
2001).
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little in maintaining careful records of their back catalog: many of the works that they 
own are worth too little, in terms of expected future revenues, to merit the expense 
required to keep track of them.  The situation in books is probably worse: a study by 
Lawrence Lessig of data in library and book annual catalogs suggests that only a tiny 
fraction of the total number of books ever published is still in print—for example, of 
10,027 books published in the U.S. in 1930, only 174 (i.e., 1.7 percent) were still in print 
in 2001.49  Publishing companies with enormous back- catalogs of out-of-print books may 
find the cost of negotiating licenses for many uses outweigh expected revenues.  Their 
back-catalogs, therefore, are effectively dead.
In sum, the transaction costs of unconditional copyright prevents many uses that 
otherwise may otherwise have been made.  For unregistered works, then—and probably 
for many registered works as well50—the current system imposes costs, without 
producing countervailing benefits in the form of revenues to rightsholders.  
2.  Renewal
Unlike registration and notice, which live on as ghosts, the renewal term is well and 
truly dead.  Under current law, all works dating from 1978 forward are protected for a 
“unified” term, which is currently set for individual works at life of the author plus 70 
years, and for corporate and anonymous works at 95 years.51
[INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3]
Figure 2 graphs the annual number of copyright renewals for the period 1910-2000; 
Figure 3 graphs the annual rate of copyright renewal—i.e., the number of renewals each 
year as a percentage of the total number of works for which the initial term was due to 
expire.52  Both graphs show what one would expect: after renewal become automatic in 
1992, both the total number and rate of renewals plummets.53
49
 Landes & Posner, supra note __, at 212.
50
 See infra, text accompanying notes ___.
51
 See 17 U.S.C. 302-04.
52
 These graphs are, like Figure 1, drawn from Landes & Posner, supra note __, and are 
based on Copyright Office data collected by those authors.
53
 That renewals did not fall to zero is due to provisions of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993), and the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), Pub. L. No. 103-465, tit. v., 514, 108 Stat. 
4809, 4976 (1994), which together restored the copyright of certain foreign works that 
had fallen into the public domain for failure to comply with mandatory formalities.  
These foreign works are restored “for the remainder of the term of copyright that the 
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II.  FORMALITIES AND THE “TRADITIONAL CONTOURS” OF CONDITIONAL COPYRIGHT
A.  Recording Ownership
To understand the role that formalities have traditionally played in the copyright law, 
and the consequences of our move from conditional to unconditional copyright, it is 
helpful to think about formalities as they function in a different and perhaps more 
familiar context: real property.  
When you buy a house, you record the transfer of title.  You do so because the law 
requires you to, but if you take a moment to think about the reasons for the law, you will 
probably grasp fairly quickly that compliance is in your best interest.  By recording your 
title, you will be able to prove your ownership when you eventually wish to sell the 
house.  Indeed, you were probably only willing to buy it in the first place—and were able 
to convince the bank to grant you a mortgage—because you were able to confirm, 
through a title search, that the person who sold it to you actually held valid title and 
therefore had the right to convey the property.  
In the case of real estate transactions, records of ownership are ordinarily maintained 
by local governments.  The requirement that title be recorded is a form of government 
regulation, but no one complains, in this particular context, that government is interfering 
in the “free market” for real estate.  For most people, their house is their biggest 
investment.  Many would not be willing to make that investment without a clear record 
that the seller actually owns the house offered for sale.  In this case, a regulatory scheme 
that creates a centralized record of ownership is a rational response to a fundamental 
characteristic of real estate—its expense, which makes would-be buyers uneasy unless 
ownership is transparent.
Formalities played an analogous role of recording ownership for the intangible form 
of property in literary and artistic works that we refer to as copyright.  While the United 
States Copyright Office, which maintains the copyright registry, has never succeeded in 
making it as reliable or as easy to search as a typical real estate title registry, it was 
nonetheless the case that, back when registration was mandatory, the copyright registry 
did allow many would-be users of a creative work that might be covered by copyright 
quickly and inexpensively to determine whether the work in question is indeed subject to 
copyright, and, if so, from whom to seek a license.  
As in the case of real estate, formalities have been implemented in the copyright 
context because they address a special characteristic of the particular type of property at 
issue.  The property interest protected by copyright is intangible—unlike real estate or 
personal property, the property embodied in copyright has no unique physical existence.  
A painting, a book, a compact disk containing an audio recording; all are physical 
work would have otherwise been granted in the United States if the work never entered 
the public domain in the United States.”  17 U.S.C. 104A(a)(B).    
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objects, but the expression fixed in each of them may, absent the workings of the law, 
freely be copied and ownership of copies transferred.  Therefore, although the question of 
who owns a particular copy of a book presents no more difficulty than does ownership of 
any particular piece of personal property, the question of who owns rights in the 
expression contained in the book most often cannot be answered simply by understanding 
who owns the book.  The registration, notice and recordation formalities created the 
information about ownership that mere possession of a copyrighted work could not.
1.  “Signaling”
Ownership in the copyright context may be less transparent than in the case of 
personal or real property, but the question of ownership is nonetheless a very important 
one to our copyright system, for at least two reasons.  The first is that the rights granted 
by the copyright laws are, unlike rights in most other forms of property, temporary.  Of 
the various limitations that the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause imposes on 
Congress’s power to grant copyrights and patents, none is more visible than the dictate 
that exclusive rights may be granted only for “limited times”.  This limitation, and others 
in the clause, are designed to balance the need to give authors and artists incentives to 
create with the equally important imperative, in a society committed to free expression, 
that public access to creative works not be impeded by government-granted monopoly.  
So the author (or his assign) is given a period of exclusive ownership, during which he is 
free to profit from his work to whatever extent his exclusive right will allow.  At the end 
of this period, however, the work remits to the public, where it will be available as the 
raw material for future acts of creativity.   
Of course, if this balancing act is to work, would-be users need to know when 
ownership of a copyrighted work began, and when it will end.  Copyright formalities, by 
creating information about ownership and the term of protection—both at the inception of 
copyright (registration, notice), and later (recordation, renewal)—fulfilled the important 
function of signaling that works had moved from the private market to the public domain.  
As such, formalities were important in ensuring that the “limited times” requirement was 
operative at the level of individual works.
2.  Maximizing Private Incentives
Ownership is also important for reasons that have to do not so much with maintaining 
the copyright balance, but with fully realizing the first element of that balance—i.e., 
incentivizing creation.  Often, copyright owners profit by allowing others to exploit their 
works through licensing arrangements: indeed, because exploitation of creative works 
often requires significant investment that authors may be ill-placed to undertake, 
licensing is a crucial mechanism for transferring rights from authors to those entities, 
such as film studios, book publishers, and record companies, best able to exploit them.
Because licensing is efficient, intellectual property policy generally seeks to 
encourage it.  Of course, licensing will be more prevalent if the transaction costs of 
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negotiating a license are low, and, historically, copyright formalities helped to lower the 
transaction costs of licensing.  They did so by creating information about ownership and 
the term of protection, which simplified the process of identifying licensors and also 
clarified the length of the term of exclusive ownership that would be the subject of a 
license.
B.  Formalities as a Copyright “Filter”
Formalities constructed a record of ownership, but they served another, arguably even 
more important, function: they allowed authors and artists to distinguish between works 
for which they desired copyright protection and those for which they did not.  Formalities 
performed this “filtering” function in two ways.  
1.  Registration and Notice
Until the 1976 Act, the registration and notice requirements served as initial 
conditions for which noncompliance meant copyright either did not arise or was 
unenforceable.  Although these initial obligations were easily satisfied, most published 
works were neither registered nor marked with copyright notice, indicating that the 
authors did not desire the protection that the copyright laws would otherwise provide—
i.e., that they did not project a net present value for royalty revenue from their work 
which exceeded the relatively trivial costs of complying with the formalities.  Thus the 
registration and notice formalities imposed an initial filter separating works with 
significant potential commercial value for which authors desired protection from other 
works for which protection was irrelevant.  The latter class of works moved immediately 
into the public domain, where they were freely usable by others (most importantly, as the 
building material for new works) without fee or the need to ask permission.  And because 
of absence of imprinted notice, the public domain status of many works was readily 
recognizable under the pre-1976 rules, even without the need to consult a registry. 
How important was this initial filter?  In an age where a popular book or record can 
return many millions of dollars for its copyright owner, it may be difficult to understand 
why a creator would fail to comply with inexpensive and relatively simple formalities 
and allow a work eligible for copyright to fall into the public domain.  But the historical 
record suggests that non-compliance is the norm rather than the exception: in the days 
when registration was a prerequisite to copyright protection, most potentially 
copyrightable materials were not registered, and therefore were not protected by 
copyright.  
Prior to the 1976 Act, all unpublished material was subject to perpetual common law 
copyright.  The relevant question, then, is what percentage of published material was 
registered and made subject to copyright.  The fact that a particular work was published 
suggests that it has some value, and that a relatively significant percentage of published 
works would be registered for the purpose of gaining protection under federal copyright.  
Yet, a 1987 study by James Gilreath and Elizabeth Carter Wills of records assembled by 
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the Library of Congress found that of the more than 15,000 maps, charts and books were 
published in the United States between 1790 and 1800, only 779 were registered and thus 
protected by copyright—a registration rate of approximately 5%.54  William Maher, in a 
recent re-examination of the Gilreath and Wills study, finds that the earlier study made 
several errors that inflated the registration rate.  Maher’s recalculation, using more 
complete bibliographic materials, suggests that the registration rate during that early 
period was even lower—3.28%.55
Some percentage of the published works were of foreign origin, and thus not eligible 
for protection under the 1790 Act, a fact that would tend to understate the rate of 
registration.56  But even if the Gilreath/Wills and Maher studies offer only a rough 
approximation, they suggest that a small percentage, probably only between 5-10%, of 
works eligible for copyright protection, were registered in the decade following the 
original copyright act.  And there is at least some evidence that the percentage of 
published works subject to copyright remained low, although probably not as low as at 
copyright’s inception.  In a 1961 report to Congress, the Register of Copyrights stated 
that “most of the great mass of published material” did not bear a copyright notice, 
indicating that many authors were simply not interested in securing copyright at all.57
Copyright Office data on copyright registration also suggests that many authors do 
not project a significant net present value for their works, and consequently place a low 
value on copyright protection.  Referring back to Figure 1, which graphs the annual 
number of registrations for the period 1910-2000, the data show that registrations more 
than quintupled during this period—reflecting both economic and population growth—
but that the number of registrations peaked in 1991 and declined by almost 20 percent 
from 1991 to 2000.  Landes and Posner argue that this decline is likely related to 
54
 See James Gilreath & Elizabeth Carter Wills, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS 1790-
1800 (Library of Congress, 1987).
55
 See Maher, supra note ___, at 1024 n.8.  Using additional information obtained from 
the SUPPLEMENT TO CHARLES EVANS’ AMERICAN BIBLIOGRAPHY (1970) about the 
number of works published in the United States, and correcting for duplicate copyright 
registrations in Gilreath’s records, Maher arrives at a larger number of published works 
(20,829) and a smaller number of copyright registrations (684).
56
 But probably not by much: working from Copyright Office registration data, Landes 
and Posner estimate that foreign works comprise only between 1 and 5 percent of U.S. 
copyright registrations.  See Landes & Posner, supra note ___, at 239 n.42.
57 Landes & Posner, supra note ___, at 235-36; see also H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 9th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1976), at 143 (Copyright notice requirement served four principal functions:  
“(1) It has the effect of placing in the public domain a substantial body of published 
material that no one is interested in copyrighting; (2) It informs the public as to whether a 
particular work is copyrighted; (3) It identifies the copyright owner; and (4) It shows the 
date of publication.”.)
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increases in the registration fee imposed during that period:58 the fee increased from $10 
to $20 in 1991, and increased again to $30 in 2000.  These relatively trivial increases in 
the cost of registration, and the contemporaneous changes in the rate of registration, 
represent a kind of natural experiment suggesting that, at the beginning of the copyright 
term, many authors place a low net present value—as low as $20 or $30, plus the 
similarly trivial cost of complying with the deposit, notice and renewal requirements—on 
their works. 
The registration requirement thus encouraged authors to assess the value of their 
works prior to first publication.  If the author expected the work to have a commercial 
value in excess of the time-adjusted cost of complying with registration and other 
formalities, he would take the steps necessary to obtain copyright protection. But if the 
costs of protection exceeded the expected revenues from copyrighting, the author would 
not register the work.59
In sum, this initial filter separating commercially valuable works from commercially 
valueless works helped focus the pre-1976 copyright regime in a way that maximized the 
incentive value of copyright while reducing the social costs.  It makes sense to exclude 
from copyright the many works for which (in the author’s judgment) protection was 
unlikely to provide more than trivial returns, for in those cases the primary effect of 
copyright would be to burden subsequent use, without countervailing private or public 
benefits.  
In our current unconditional copyright system, we have discarded this initial filter, 
and, as a result, copyright burdens the creative process in ways that it did not before.  For 
works that lack significant commercial value but nonetheless have some cultural 
significance—as, for example, an exemplar of some historical trend in politics, literature 
or the arts—unconditional copyright raises the cost of copying the work for non-
commercial or scholarly uses by at least the value of the time spent identifying the 
rightsholder and seeking permission.  An example would be an academic study of the 
58
 As Landes and Posner note, see n.___ at 235 n.40, another factor potentially 
contributing to the decline in registrations may be that since 1989 registration has no 
longer been a condition for bringing an infringement suit for foreign works protected 
under the Berne Convention.  Because foreign works constitute a small percentage of 
works registered in the U.S., however, the total exemption of foreign works from 
voluntary registration is a relatively unimportant determinant of registration rates.
59
 If an author (or, perhaps more relevantly, a publisher) foresees little commercial value 
for a particular work, that work may neither registered nor published, in which case the 
federal copyright term would not commence under pre-1976 law, see 1909 Act, §§10, 11; 
rather, the work would have been subject to perpetual common law copyright.  As noted 
earlier, under post-1976 rules, fixation in a tangible medium, and not publication, is now 
the trigger for copyright.  See supra, text accompanying note ___.  
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advent and explosive growth of Internet “weblogging”.60  Imagine that the author wishes 
to use a large number of weblog “posts” as source material for its analysis.  Unless the 
subject weblogs signaled freedom of use through a Creative Commons license or the 
equivalent,61 the academic who wanted to include a large number of weblog posts in his 
study would be obliged to clear rights to each post (or at least each post from which he 
wanted to draw more than limited quotations), or trust his fate to the vagaries of the fair 
use doctrine.62  The burden of clearing rights for a large number of sources would make 
the academic project much more expensive.    
Unconditional copyright also burdens potentially valuable transformative uses by 
raising the cost of using commercially valueless source material as building blocks for 
derivative works that take the original, improve on it, and find a market.  Examples 
abound of derivative works that enjoy commercial success far surpassing their source 
material: one relatively recent instance is the song “Superman”, a hit in 1986 for the 
Athens, Georgia band R.E.M.  “Superman” had originally been released in 1969 by The 
Clique, an obscure Houston, Texas group.  The Clique’s version of the song was not a hit 
(in fact, it was the b-side to The Clique’s only hit single, “Sugar On Sunday”), and the 
band released only a single, eponymous album which, by the time R.E.M. recorded its 
cover, had long been “out of print”.  Due, however, to the popularity of the R.E.M. cover 
60
 A weblog (sometimes shortened to “blog”) is a web site, usually of non-commercial 
origin, that uses a dated log format updated on a daily or very frequent basis with new 
information about a particular subject or range of subjects.  Weblog content may be 
written by the blog’s owner, gleaned from other Internet or non-Internet sources, or 
contributed by users.  A weblog may consist of the “postings” of the blog’s owner, or 
may accept posts from users. 
For examples of popular weblogs, see “Slashdot”, <http//:slashdot.org>, a user-driven 
blog focused on issues of interest to the programming community, or 
“TalkingPointsMemo”, <http://talkingpointsmemo.com>, the personal weblog of Joshua 
Micah Marshall, a Washington, DC journalist.
61
 Some weblogs do precisely that.  See, e.g., “Baby and Baggage”, the weblog of 
appellate and intellectual property lawyer Denise Howell, at 
<http://bgbg.blogspot.com/>.  See infra at text accompanying notes ___ for further 
discussion of Creative Commons.
62
 For a large and diverse set of examples of uses of copyrighted material that might 
conceivably be deemed “fair” but have nonetheless drawn allegations of infringement 
and demands to cease and desist, see <http://www.chillingeffects.org/>.  The need for 
both would-be users and rightsholders to engage in expensive legal analysis of the four 
indeterminate factors that together comprise the statutory test for fair use, see 17 U.S.C. 
107, is itself a cost imposed with significantly greater frequency in an unconditional 
copyright regime.   
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version of “Superman”, a compilation recording of The Clique’s work was re-issued in 
1998.63
R.E.M.’s re-working of The Clique’s “Superman” was eased by the provision of our 
copyright law imposing compulsory licenses for “mechanical rights”—i.e., a compulsory 
license that gives artists the ability to record and distribute their own versions of musical 
compositions for a fee set by statute.64  But for derivative works other than new 
performances of musical compositions, an author wishing to use even the most obscure 
and commercially valueless material must identify a rightsholder and ask permission.  
The necessity of identifying rightsholders and negotiating rights raises the cost of 
creating derivative works; consequently, output of potentially valuable derivative works 
will fall, in comparison to a conditional regime in which commercially valueless source 
materials were filtered out of the copyright regime at their inception.   
Although the utility of the registration and notice formalities seems obvious, they 
have more often been viewed, on balance, as a hindrance.  A 1904 report by the Register 
of Copyrights makes that point, lamenting that “a system has gradually grown up under 
which valuable literary rights have come to depend upon exact compliance with the 
statutory formalities which have no relation to the equitable rights involved, and the 
question may very well be raised whether this condition should be continued.”65
Criticism of formalities and tales of hardship arising from accidental non-compliance 
abound in the historical copyright literature.66
There are two principal responses to the “unintentional noncompliance” objection to 
formalities.  The first is that failure to comply with formalities is “endogenous”—i.e., 
failure to comply with mandatory formalities is evidence that the value of the work in 
63
 See 
<http://store.artistdirect.com/music/artist/bio/0,,415704,00.html?artist=The+Clique>.
64
 See 17 U.S.C. 115.  The compulsory license provision requires that notice be given to 
the licensor within 30 days of making the recording, and before any distribution.  But, in 
a proviso that is especially relevant here, section 115(b)(1) provides that “[i]f the 
registration or other public records of the Copyright Office do not identify the copyright 
owner and include an address at which notice can be served, it shall be sufficient to file 
the notice of intention in the Copyright Office.”
65
 Report on Copyright Legislation by the Register of Copyrights (1904), at p. 25. 
66
 See, e.g., Statement of Abraham L. Kaminstein, Register of Copyrights, before the 
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 89th Cong., 1st Sess (Aug. 18, 
1965), at p. 68 (“The present law [i.e., the 1909 Act] contains a number of highly 
technical requirements concerning copyright notice, registration, and deposit, and the 
recording of assignments which are not only burdensome and difficult to understand but 
which, in too many cases, result in complete loss of copyright protection.”).
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question is less than the cost of educating oneself about and complying with a particular 
formality.67  Because a person in possession of rights to a valuable work will be incented 
to educate himself about the steps required to perfect and maintain those rights, we need 
not concern ourselves about noncompliance—it is not evidence of a failure of the system 
of formalities, but a signal that the prospect of obtaining or maintaining rights in the work 
is not valuable enough to merit the required investment in compliance.  Indeed, because 
formalities make sense, in part, as a filter separating commercially valuable from 
commercially valueless works, the cost of complying with formalities should be set at a 
level high enough to incent compliance only for those works valuable enough that the 
benefit of protection is likely to exceed the costs. 
Of course, many would prefer that the decision whether to comply with formalities be 
an informed one, rather than an accident.  The second response to the noncompliance 
problem proceeds from the assumption that we are not willing to ignore noncompliance 
as “endogenous”.  The rate of noncompliance is dependent, to some extent, upon the 
difficulty of educating oneself about and then complying with a particular formality.  
Administering registration and renewal through simple on-line forms would lower the 
cost of complying with these formalities and reduce the incidence of unintentional 
noncompliance.  Similarly, turning over the task of administering registration and 
renewal formalities to a number of private firms would, by sparking competition to 
expand the pool of consumers of “formalities-compliance services”, produce consumer 
information about compliance with formalities and further reduce the incidence of 
unintentional noncompliance.  Lawrence Lessig has suggested that private provision of 
formalities-compliance services could be modeled on the current system for registering 
Internet domain names—i.e., a central registry maintained by government or a public-
private partnership (like the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN),68 which maintains the main top-level Internet domains (.com, .org, .net)), into 
which many competing registrars feed the data that is submitted by consumers (in the 
Internet context, firms like Stargate.com69 and Network Solutions70 compete to offer 
domain name registration services).  As Professor Lessig notes, competition between 
competing registrars drives down the cost of registering an Internet domain name, and 
drives up the ease with which registration occurs.71  There is no reason that competition 
couldn’t do the same in the context of compliance with copyright formalities.
There is one final observation (not exactly an objection) related to the filtering 
function of registration and notice.  It might be argued that, even in our current 
67
 See Landes & Posner, supra note __, at 238.
68
 See <http://www.icann.org/general/>.
69
 See <http://www.stargateinc.com/>. 
70
 See <http://www.networksolutions.com/en_US/>.
71
 See Lessig, Free Culture, supra note ___, at 289.
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unconditional system, authors are free to dedicate their works to the public domain, and, 
therefore, rather than re-install formalities we should encourage public domain deeding as
a method of filtering commercially valueless works out of copyright.  
But dedication to the public domain is not a substitute for the filtering function that 
formalities formerly provided in a conditional copyright system.  First, there is no 
provision in our current unconditional regime establishing rules for how dedication may 
be accomplished, and it has never been conclusively determined under current law that 
one may irreversibly dedicate a work to the public domain (dedication has, however, 
been judicially enforced under pre-1976 law).72  Assuming dedication can be done, it 
must be accomplished by a license “to the world”; via, for example, a statement 
imprinted on all copies of a published work that “the author grants a nonexclusive right to 
any person to use this work in any way.”  The process of dedication is thus the mirror 
image of compliance with registration and notice formalities.  In a conditional system, a 
rightsholder must invest in compliance with formalities to obtain protection.  In an 
unconditional system, a rightsholder must spend time and money on the process of 
dedication in order to disclaim protection.  The conditional system relies on self-interest 
to filter commercially valueless works out of copyright.  The dedication process in an
unconditional system relies on altruism to do the same job, and has not yet been shown to 
be an effective mechanism. 
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that, in our current unconditional system, public 
domain dedication should not be encouraged: dedication is not a complete answer, but it 
can help, and new ways should be found to make the process more effective.  Creative 
Commons, a project formed by a group of activists, academics, and content creators to 
give rightsholders choices about how their works may be used in addition to the “all 
rights reserved” default of the formal copyright law, has been active on this front.73
Creative Commons provides a variety of “some rights reserved” licenses, including 
licenses allowing free use with attribution,74 noncommercial use,75 use without the right 
to make derivative works,76 and use with the requirement that the user make freely usable 
by others any derivative work created using the original source material (referred to as 
the “share-alike” license,77 similar in purpose to the “copyleft” movement’s Open 
72
 See, e.g., Bell v. Combined Registry Co., 397 F.Supp. 1241 (N.D.Ill. 1975), aff'd, 536 
F.2d 164 (1976) (holding that rightsholder “had [...] abandoned the copyright by 
authorizing others to use it without limitation (as a "gift" to the world)”). 
73
 See <http://creativecommons.org/learn/aboutus/>.
74
 See <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/1.0/>.
75
 See <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/nc/1.0/>.
76
 See <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/nd/1.0/>.
77
 See <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/sa/1.0/>.
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Software License78 and GNU General Public License).79  Creative Commons also 
provides a “no rights reserved” Public Domain Dedication license, which provides a 
perpetual and unconditional license “for the benefit of the public at large and to the 
detriment of the Dedicator's heirs and successors,”80 as well as a “Founders’ Copyright” 
license, by which rightsholders agree to dedicate their work to the public domain after 
either a 14 or 28-year period.81  I will return to Creative Commons later, as we consider 
how to build and implement new-style formalities.    
2.  Renewal
Until it was eliminated by the 1976 Act (for pre-1978 works) and the Berne 
Convention Implementation Act (for all other works), the renewal formality imposed 
another filter, one that operated later in the life-cycle of the copyrighted work as a “post-
test” of commercial viability.  A feature of U.S. law that originated with the founding 
(1790) copyright statute, the renewal formality required copyright owners to re-register 
their works at the end of a relatively short initial term of protection.  Failure to re-register 
meant that the work moved into the public domain.  
The effect of the renewal requirement was, again, to measure authors’ desire for 
protection.  The mechanism was the same as that for the initial filter of registration, only 
it measured not whether a work had commercial value at its inception, but whether its 
value was enduring.  Works that, at the end of the initial copyright term (first 14 and later 
28 years) retained commercial value, were renewed.  Authors would not bother, however, 
to renew works that had ceased to profit them at the end of the initial term, and for which 
they held no realistic expectation of future profit.  Historically, approximately 15% of 
works have been renewed, meaning that 85% of works moved into the public domain—
by consent of rightsholders—after a relatively short term of protection.
  As in the case of registration, Copyright Office data on renewal rates suggest that 
many authors place a low value on continued copyright protection at the end of an initial 
copyright term.  In a 1961 report based on data subsequent to the 1909 Act, the Register 
of Copyrights stated that, for the minority of published works that were registered and for 
which notice of copyright was given, less than 15 percent of all copyrights on these 
works were being renewed.82
78
 See <http://www.opensource.org/licenses/osl-2.0.php>.
79
 See <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html>.
80
 See <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/publicdomain/>.
81
 See <http://creativecommons.org/projects/founderscopyright/>.
82
 Barbara A. Ringer, Renewal of Copyright, in STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 503, 616-20 
(Arthur Fisher Memorial ed. 1963).
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Landes and Posner, looking at Copyright Office data from 1910-2000, arrive at the 
same average rate of renewal—around 15%.  Figures 2 and 3, reproduced above at p.__, 
graph the annual number of renewals and the rate of copyright renewal, respectively, for 
the period 1910-2000.83  The data show that the gross number of renewals grew by a 
factor of more than 10 between 1910 and 1991.  But the percentage of works renewed 
remained low throughout the period.  Working from the same data used by the Copyright 
Office, Landes and Posner estimate the rate of renewal at less than 11% for the period 
between 1883 and 1964, even though the renewal fee was trivial throughout this period.84
The rate of renewal rose somewhat between 1980 and 1990, when it reached its single-
year high of 22%.  Beginning in 1992, however, the rate began to decline sharply; as 
noted above,85 in 1992 renewal became automatic under the Berne Convention 
Implementation Act, and the decline in renewal was in large part driven by the 
elimination of renewal as a formality.  But because the 1992 amendments did not 
eliminate all incentive to renew a work,86 Landes and Posner argue that the decline in 
renewal is also likely to be related to increases in the renewal fee, which doubled to $12 
in 1991, rose to $20 in 1993, and rose again to $45 in 2000. 
If the general rate of renewal is low, renewal rates of certain significant classes of 
works were even lower: the renewal rate for books has averaged less than 8%, and for 
graphic arts, approximately 3%.87   The average renewal rate over this period for music is 
higher (32%),88 as one would expect given the regularity with which even very old songs 
are re-worked with new performers and arrangements (as well as the existence of a 
compulsory license scheme allowing such re-workings to be made in exchange for a 
statutory royalty and without the need to ask for permission).89  But the renewal rate even 
for music peaked in 1956 and fell steadily after that.  By 1969, the end of the data period 
83
 Landes & Posner, supra note __, at 236.
84
 The renewal fee was $1 from 1909 to 1947, $2 from 1948 to 1965, $4 from 1966 to 
1977, $6 from 1978 to 1990, $12 from 1991 to 1992, $20 from 1993 to 1999, and $45 
from 2000 to the present.  See Landes and Posner, supra n. ____, at 212 n.8; Robert A. 
Gorman and Jane C. Ginsburg, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 356-57 (6th ed. 
2002).
85
 See supra at text accompanying notes __-__.
86
 See infra at text accompanying note ___.
87
 See Landes & Posner, supra note __, at 241-44.
88
 Id. at 243.
89
 See infra at text accompanying notes ____.
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for renewals disaggregated by type of work, the renewal rate for music had fallen almost 
to the historical norm for all works of around 15%.90
In sum, the renewal data reinforces what the registration data suggests—that the 
difference between an unconditional and a conditional copyright system, in terms of the 
scope of the works each system reaches, is profound.  In a conditional system, only a 
small portion of copyrightable works is valuable enough at inception to merit registration.  
And only a small portion of works retains enough value at the end of an initial term to 
merit renewal.  Using Copyright Office registration and renewal data, Landes and Posner 
estimate an average annual depreciation rate for copyrighted works ranging between 
5.4% and 12.2%,91 which results in an average expected commercial life for copyrighted 
works that ranges from 8.2 to 18.5 years.92  Working from copyrights registered in a 
single year, 1934, the authors estimate that 50% of the registered works had fully 
depreciated in just 10 years, 90% in 43 years, and 99% in 65 years.93
These findings are supported by the results of a 1998 study by the Congressional 
Research Service, which examined a sample of copyrights renewed after an initial term of 
28 years.  The CRS study concluded that only 11% of renewed copyrights in books, 12% 
in musical works, and 26% in motion pictures had some continuing commercial value.94
The high rate of depreciation, and the resulting low historical rate of copyright 
renewal, both underscore the utility of the renewal formality.  At the end of a 28-year 
initial term, relatively few works enjoy any continuing commercial value.  The necessity 
of renewing rights filters commercially valueless works out of copyright.  But that is not 
the only benefit of renewal, for the process also allows a bit of further fine-tuning.  If the 
cost of renewal is set at a level at least equal to the average cost to would-be users of 
clearing rights—a cost that is not currently known but that readily could be established95
in a re-formalized system with a functional registry—works will be renewed and remain 
under copyright only if the expected benefit from continued protection exceeds the 
expected costs of negotiating a license.  
3.  Effect of the Renewal Formality on the Real Term of Copyright
90
 Id. at 242.
91
 Id. at 238-39.
92
 Id. at 240.
93
 Id.
94
 Edward Rappaport, Copyright Term Extension: Estimating the Economic Values, 
Congressional Research Service Report 98-144E (1998). 
95
 At least prospectively, for works registered subsequent to re-formalization.
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The renewal formality made the “real” term of copyright (in contrast to the nominal 
term set out in the copyright statutes) very short by our current standards.  For the subset 
of works that were not eliminated by the initial (registration and notice) filter and were 
therefore subject to copyright, the longest effective copyright term prior to the 1976 Act, 
at an average renewal rate of 15%, was 32.2 years.96  Using the highest historical renewal 
figure for all works, 22% (1990), the average term of copyright would be 34.1 years.97
Under our current unconditional copyright system, there is no longer any filtering 
mechanism tailoring the term of individual works, and, consequently, the real and 
nominal copyright terms have converged.  The 1976 Act switched from a fixed term of 
years to a variable (or, more properly, indeterminate) term for works by individual 
authors: at first, life of the author plus 50 years, later extended by the CTEA to life plus 
70 years.  For corporate works—known in the argot as “works for hire”—and anonymous 
works, the 1976 Act fixed a term of 75 years from the date of publication or 100 years 
from creation, whichever expired first.  The CTEA extended those terms to 95 and 120 
years, respectively.  
The copyright term is now sufficiently long that the net present value to the 
rightsholder of a copyright is barely distinguishable from what it would be under a 
perpetual term.  In a brief amicus curiae submitted to the Supreme Court in support of 
petitioners in Eldred v. Ashcroft, a group of economists that included Nobel Prize 
winners George Akerlof, Kenneth Arrow, James Buchanan, Ronald Coase and Milton 
Friedman argued that the current, post-CTEA copyright term of life plus 70 years has a 
net present value that is 99.88% of the value of a perpetual term.98
That the copyright term is now effectively perpetual is an odd development in a 
country whose constitution specifies that copyrights may be granted only for “limited 
times.”99 As will be discussed in greater detail later in this Article, copyright’s primary 
96
 Under pre-1976 law, the longest duration for both the initial and renewal terms was 28 
years.  Accordingly, using an renewal rate of 15%, the average term of copyright is as 
follows: 0.15(56)+0.85(28).
97
 Using the highest renewal figure of 22%, the calculation is 0.22(56)+0.85(28).
98
 See Economists’ Brief, supra note ___, at 8.  
99 I am indebted to Tim Phillips for pointing out to me just how odd.  Correspondence 
between Madison, who crafted the Intellectual Property Clause, and Jefferson suggests 
that the Founders thought of the proper length of a limited copyright term in quite 
specific actuarial terms.  Having resigned himself to the inclusion of a clause authorizing 
Congress to create copyrights and patents—a power he initially opposed as liable to lead 
to the creation of dangerous “monopolies”—Jefferson proposed in a letter (posted from 
France) of August 28, 1789 that copyrights and patents be limited in duration to a fixed 
term of years.  A few days afterward, in a letter of September 6, 1789, Jefferson proposed 
a term of 19 years, based on an actuarial calculation:
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justification in the United States, at least as it has been articulated historically, is as a 
means of ensuring that creators realize a large enough share of whatever revenue their 
works may produce to ensure that they are induced to invest in production of creative 
works.  Copyright in the U.S. has tended to focus on this utilitarian justification, in 
contrast to a natural rights or “labor desert” paradigm that premises copyright on 
protection of the author’s right to the fruits of his intellectual labor, or to a moral rights 
paradigm in which copyright serves mainly to protect an author’s control over his identity 
(i.e., personality) as reflected in his creative works.100  As Paul Goldstein and others have 
observed, although at the level of theory one might expect our utilitarian system to 
operate quite differently from systems in continental Europe that are purportedly based 
on a mixture of natural and moral rights justifications, in reality copyright systems in the 
developed world have converged, and now provide a set of protections that approach 
what one would expect under a natural rights paradigm.101
The question Whether one generation of men has a right to bind another 
seems never to have been started on this [i.e., the European side] or our 
[American] side of the water . . . .  [T]hat no such obligation can be so 
transmitted I think very capable of proof.   I set out on this ground, which I 
suppose to be self evident, that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living; 
that the dead have neither powers nor rights over it . . . .   A generation 
coming in and going out entire . . . would have a right on the first year of 
their self-dominion to contract a debt for 33 years, in the 10th for 24, in 
the 20th for 14, in the 30th for 4, whereas generations, changing daily by 
daily deaths and births, have one constant term, beginning at the date of 
their contract, and ending when a majority of those of full age at that date 
shall be dead.  The length of that term may be estimated from the tables of 
mortality.  Take, for instance, the tables of M. de Buffon . . . [according to 
which] half of those of 21 years and upwards living at any one instant of 
time will be dead in 18 years 8 months, or say 19 years as the nearest 
integral number.  Then 19 years is the term beyond which neither the 
representatives of a nation, nor even the whole nation itself assembled, can 
validly extend a debt . . . .  This principle that the earth belongs to the 
living, and not to the dead, is of very extensive application . . . .  Establish 
the principle . . . in the new law to be passed for protecting copyrights and 
new inventions, by securing the exclusive right for 19 instead of 14 years.
A like computation using life tables from 1992 yields a Jeffersonian copyright term of 
between 30 and 35 years. (See Vital Statistics of the United States 1992, Volume II, 
Mortality, Part A, Public Health Service, Hyattsville, 1996, Section 6, Table 6-1.)  
100
 See generally Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L. J. 
287 (1988).
101 See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, I COPYRIGHT § 1.13.2 (2d ed., 2004 Supp.).
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The ever-lengthening term of copyright is perhaps the best example of our system’s 
convergence with natural rights.  A natural rights-based system would not necessarily 
impose a perpetual term, but one that allowed the author to capture substantially all of the 
fruits of his labor—i.e., one in which the net present value of the term was virtually 
indistinguishable from a perpetual term.  That is, as the economists’ brief in Eldred
shows, exactly the kind of term we now have in the U.S. system.  But even as our notions 
regarding the optimal copyright term have shifted closer to the natural rights paradigm, 
the deeper rationale for the filtering function of copyright formalities is still relevant: 
requiring compliance with formalities helps to reduce the social costs imposed by 
granting exclusive rights in expression.
4. The Costs of Copyright
a. The Social Cost of Monopoly
Any copyright system that grants exclusive rights, whether based in a utilitarian or 
natural/moral rights conception, imposes a number of different social costs.  First, there is 
an obvious economic cost, which is a specific instance of the general problem of 
monopoly: if a particular creative work has a market value, exclusive rights will enable 
the creator to charge a supracompetitive price, with the consequence that access to the 
work will be denied to those who value it in excess of the competitive price, but less than 
the supracompetitive price that the monopolist is able to command. 102  Copyright, then, 
creates deadweight loss in markets for expression.
The monopoly costs of copyright, while very real for works that possess significant 
commercial value, are relatively unimportant to the commercially valueless or exhausted 
works that conditional copyright filtered out but unconditional copyright locks up.  While 
an unconditional system keeps economically spent works under copyright, the persistence 
of exclusive rights can do little to raise the price of a piece of expression that is 
commercially valueless—the rightsholder, in such an instance, may have a monopoly, but 
he does not ordinarily have the power to demand a supracompetitive price.  
b.  Copyright’s Burdens on Speech
Much more important, for our purposes, are the two types of “cultural” cost imposed 
by copyright.  Copyright imposes a First Amendment cost inhering in the restrictions on 
free speech imposed when rightsholders are allowed to prevent copying of their work.  
The recent copyright dispute involving the Diebold corporation provides an example of a
potentially significant First Amendment cost imposed by copyright.  Diebold Election 
Systems, Inc. manufactures electronic voting machines.  Sometime in early 2003, a 
hacker broke into Diebold’s computer systems and stole a large number of internal emails 
and memoranda.  Some of the stolen Diebold documents include discussions of software 
bugs in the Diebold voting machines and warnings that the machines may produce 
102
 For a more fully developed account of the benefits and costs of copyright, see Linda 
R. Cohen and Roger G. Noll, Intellectual Property, Antitrust and the New Economy, 62 
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 453 (2001).
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unverifiable results and are poorly protected against hackers.103  In August, 2003, an 
unknown person mailed approximately 13,000 pages of the stolen data to a number of 
activists concerned with electronic voting, many of whom published the Diebold emails 
and memos, or linked to those documents, on their web sites.  
In response, Diebold sent dozens of cease-and-desist notices, pursuant to the “notice 
and take-down” provisions of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act,104 to website 
publishers and ISPs demanding that they remove the documents from websites, and cease 
linking to the documents.  Two recipients of the Diebold letters, a group of Swarthmore 
College students and an ISP providing pro bono Internet hosting to non-profit 
organizations, filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that their publication of the 
Diebold documents is lawful. 
The Diebold case is still pending as of this writing, but the result is less relevant for 
our purposes than what the facts of the case say about the free speech costs of 
unconditional copyright.  Clearly, copyright incentives have little to do with whether 
Diebold creates the type of corporate documents at issue in this case: Diebold’s 
employees and contractors create and distribute these documents in the ordinary course of 
Diebold’s business, and they will continue to do so without regard to their copyright 
status.  In our unconditional copyright system, where the Diebold documents gain 
automatic copyright protection at the moment of their fixation, the only function of 
copyright is to allow Diebold to inhibit public discussion of whether its voting machines 
are reliable.  In contrast, in a reformalized system, most of the Diebold documents likely 
never would be subject to federal copyright in the first place (because Diebold does not 
expect to profit from the content itself, it almost certainly would not invest in compliance 
with formalities) and consequently Diebold would be unable to use copyright law as a 
means of limiting discussion regarding an issue of the highest public concern.105
103
 For factual background, see the Amended Complaint, available at 
<http://www.eff.org/Legal/ISP_liability/OPG_v_Diebold/First_Amended_Complaint.pdf
>.
104 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), passed by Congress in 1998, 
provides a “safe harbor” provision as an incentive for ISPs to take down user-posted 
content when they receive cease-and-desist letters such as the ones sent by Diebold.  See 
17 U.S.C. 512(c).  By removing the content, or forcing the user to do so, for a minimum 
of 10 days, an ISP can immunize itself from any copyright claim. 
105
 Note that under the pre-1976 regime, where federal copyright commenced upon 
“publication” and perpetual common law copyright applied to unpublished works, 
Diebold’s unpublished corporate memoranda would likely be subject to common law 
copyright and Diebold would still have a powerful copyright lever.  (I say “likely”, rather 
than “certainly”, because the pre-1976 rules determining what constituted 
“publication”—the trigger that terminated state common law copyright and moved a 
work (upon compliance with formalities) into the federal system—were the subject of 
substantial debate and confusion.  See William S. Strauss, Protection of Unpublished 
Works, in STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 8-15 (Arthur Fisher Memorial ed. 1963).   In contrast, 
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The Diebold disputes shows us that by bringing within the scope of copyright a huge 
number of works for which its incentive system is irrelevant, our unconditional system 
makes the potential conflict between copyright and the First Amendment much more 
severe.106  This is an important point that no court has ever addressed, but which is 
quickly becoming salient.  
c.  Copyright “Buffering” Doctrines and the First Amendment 
When considering the potential friction between copyright and the First Amendment, 
courts (including the Supreme Court in Eldred) have often pointed to two doctrines, the 
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense, that act as buffers preventing 
copyright from interfering unduly with free speech.  Because copyright protects only 
expression, courts have reasoned, ideas remain free for others to discuss and build upon.  
And because it is sometimes important, in talking about an idea, to use a particular bit of 
expression that may be protected, the fair use doctrine operates to allow the use of 
portions of a protected work for purposes—chiefly academic and journalistic criticism, 
and parody—that are considered necessary to maintaining the vibrancy of political and 
cultural debate.  
Although the Eldred Court was not entirely clear on the point, its opinion suggests 
that these doctrines are the “traditional contours” of copyright that, left untouched, suffice
to protect copyright’s cohabitation with the First Amendment.107 But the Court’s 
reliance on these doctrines is almost certain to come under increasing strain.  The 
idea/expression dichotomy makes perfect sense for one medium, written text, where the 
separation of idea from expression is relatively straightforward.  But idea/expression 
never applied particularly well to non-textual media, such as music or graphic arts, where 
the “idea” is difficult, if not impossible, to separate from the expression. As technology 
shifts creativity toward new media that focus on “re-mixing” or “mashing up” bits of 
film, text, music, and graphic arts, we can expect to see fewer instances where the 
idea/expression dichotomy can do much to insulate re-use of existing work from 
infringement liability.
The same dynamic is now undermining the fair use doctrine. In the old media world 
of paper books, celluloid films, magnetic videotapes, and vinyl recordings (or even, until 
recently, unencrypted CDs), one gained the ability to make a fair use simply by acquiring 
a copy of the work—because there were exceedingly few analogs, in the analog world, to 
under a reformalized version of our post-1976 system, where federal copyright arises 
upon fixation and common law copyright has been eliminated, the Diebold memoranda 
would almost certainly never enter the copyright system.
106
 See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 923 F. 
Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (copyright used to prevent dissenters from distributing 
Church of Scientology materials).  See also Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: 
Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 Yale L. J. 1 (2002).
107 537 U.S. at 220.
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today's digital encryption and rights management technologies, one was granted access 
by virtue of possession.  But in the digital environment, possession does not necessarily 
imply the ability to make fair uses.  Digital works are often encrypted, and the Digital 
Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA)108 imposes civil and criminal penalties for the use—
or even the distribution—of technologies designed to circumvent access and copy 
controls protecting copyrighted works.109  Courts in cases like Universal City Studios, 
Inc. v. Corley110 have held that the right of fair use does not imply a right of access to 
copyrighted works that may be required to make a fair use.111 That holding threatens to 
make fair use a mirage as technology shifts creativity from analog to digital media.  
Whereas questions of access in the analog world only come up when the access sought is 
to someone else’s property— how could it be otherwise, since possession of analog 
materials necessarily entailed access to make a copy?—the issue we confront now in the 
digital world is access to one's own property for the purpose of making fair uses. Put that 
way, a right of access does not seem much of a leap. So to say that there is no judicially-
established right of access to make fair uses of copyrighted materials is not to say much. 
In the analog world we lived in until (at least in the timeframe of the law) only yesterday, 
the question simply never came up.
For the moment, however, it is clear that if fair use in the digital environment depends 
on fair access, the opportunities to make fair uses in a world of strong (and legally 
enforced) encryption are going to be substantially restricted.  As with the idea/expression 
dichotomy, the shift from the analog to the digital environment has altered (i.e., has 
constricted) the “traditional contours” of the fair use doctrine.  In the case of fair use, 
however, the constriction is worse, because it is not simply the product of shifting 
technologies, but of government action—i.e., the DMCA, which prohibits circumvention 
without providing any exception for fair use access.
So if idea/expression and fair use have been enfeebled, are there other “traditional 
contours” of copyright that remain vigorous enough to mediate between copyright and 
the First Amendment?  There is—or, more properly, was—a third “buffer” that played a 
very significant role: copyright formalities.  Under conditional copyright, formalities 
served to limit copyright protection to works that had independent value as expression.
Works that lacked expression value ordinarily would not be copyrighted.  The purpose of 
copyright is to incent expression ex ante; not to serve as a locking mechanism ex post.
Copyright formalities created an incentive structure that aligned the material protected 
under copyright with the overarching justification for the regime.  With the disappearance 
of formalities, perversions of copyright like we observe in Diebold become not only 
possible, but inevitable.
108
 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28, 1998).
109
 See 17 U.S.C. 1201.
110
 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
111
 Id. at 458-59.
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d.  Copyright’s Burden on Creativity
In addition to burdening free speech, copyright also imposes costs on future creativity 
by shrinking the stock of pre-existing materials available to future creators for use as 
building blocks in new works, which reduces consequentially the production of new 
works.112  Unlike the monopoly problem, copyright’s toll on future creativity arises 
regardless of whether a particular work has a market value. 
Individual acts of intellectual creativity may begin with a blank piece of paper, but 
the creative process itself is cumulative—every creative work builds on materials that 
already exist in the culture.  Restraints on the ability to copy an entire work are likely 
have only marginal effects on the creation of future works: although many creative works 
refer to previous works, such reference rarely involves literal copying of the entire 
predecessor work.  But copyright reaches further than wholesale, literal copying.  
Copyright allows a rightsholder to restrain works that contain elements “substantially 
similar” to any more than a trivial portion of the rightsholder’s work.113  In addition, the 
law gives the rightsholder control over derivative works—i.e., works that involve the 
transformative re-use of original (and therefore protected) elements of the rightsholder’s 
work.114
The costs of copyright that we have just reviewed are substantially higher in an 
unconditional copyright system.  Formalities, as least as they operated in the conditional 
copyright system that existed before 1976, minimized the costs of exclusive rights while 
retaining all or virtually all of the benefits.  They did so by focusing the protections of 
copyright on those works that were judged by their authors, first at their inception and 
then again after an initial period of protection, to be the kind of commercially valuable 
creative material that could, if protected by copyright, potentially provide a return to their 
author.  For these works, the incentive effect of copyright was potentially large enough to 
justify the cost of protection.  But for works that were not expected to provide a return for 
their authors, protection involves only potential costs.  Protection for works that authors 
judge commercially valueless—i.e., the majority of works—is a net loss for social 
welfare.   
C.  Formalities and “Utilitarian” Copyright
In addition to their role in focusing copyright (i.e., filtering) and creating ownership 
information, there is a deeper justification for formalities which ties together much of 
what has just been said: formalities are an important component of our original 
112
 See Posner and Landes, supra n ___ at pp. 58-60 (providing examples of 
transformative use of pre-existing materials in works of Shakespeare, Yeats, and Eliot, 
among others).
113 See Goldstein, supra note ___, at § 7.2.1.2.
114 See Goldstein, supra note ___, at § 7.4.1.1.
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constitutional commitment to a utilitarian model of copyright.  As we have moved closer 
to a natural rights paradigm in our copyright practice, the foundations of American 
copyright at both the constitutional and statutory levels have been obscured.  But the 
original commitments are still there, awaiting the right plaintiff to revive them.   
1.  The Intellectual Property Clause
Why did the “traditional contours” of pre-1976 U.S. copyright law require 
compliance with so many bothersome formalities?  In order to understand the role of 
formalities in our pre-1976 conditional copyright system, it is helpful first to look at the
source of Congress’s authority to enact copyright laws, the Constitution’s Intellectual 
Property Clause.  The clause does not itself require that Congress install any particular 
formality in copyright laws.  Yet it reflects an original understanding of the purpose of 
copyright that led, in the early copyright statutes and for almost two centuries thereafter, 
to a system that relied heavily on formalities.  
Article I, § 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution confers upon Congress 
authority: 
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.
As the Supreme Court has recognized, the Intellectual Property Clause is “both a 
grant of power and a limitation.”115  But aside from formulating that aphorism, the 
Supreme Court has done little to limn either the power or the limitation, or to define the 
judicial role in ensuring that Congress’s copyright lawmaking remains within the 
boundaries set out by the clause.
The most significant continuing dispute in the interpretation of the Intellectual 
Property Clause involves the most basic question of interpretation: which part of the 
clause sets out the enumerated power?  Edward Walterscheid has argued that the grant of 
power resides in the “promote . . . Progress” language, and that that power, moreover, is a 
general one that authorizes Congress to undertake a variety of schemes, such as the 
funding of medical research or grants to arts organizations, with the common purposes of 
encouraging discovery and spreading culture. Walterscheid contends that the second part 
of the clause (the “exclusive Right[s]” language) was added only for the purpose of 
making clear that, subject to certain limitations, Congress was authorized to grant patents 
and copyrights as part of its general power to advance learning.116
115
 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
116
 Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The 
Anatomy of a Congressional Power, 43 IDEA 1 (2002).
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More often, however, it has been argued that the power resides in the “exclusive 
Right[s]” part of the clause.  According to this interpretation, the power granted is 
specific—i.e., Congress is authorized to grant limited-time exclusive rights, for the 
purpose of advancing learning.  The federal government’s general power to “promote . . . 
Progress” through other means, if it exists at all in the Constitution, must reside 
elsewhere.117
Questions also remain regarding how the clause limits Congress’s exercise of its 
power.  The clause limits the copyright grant to the “writings” of “authors”—by virtue of 
these limitations, there can be no grant of exclusive rights in ideas (as opposed to 
expression), and no grants to publishers.  There is also, as mentioned previously, the 
“limited times” requirement.   
The clause also imposes a more general limitation.  In its opinion in Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, the Supreme Court announced that the “promote . . . Progress” phrase functions 
as a limitation on Congress’s power to enact copyright laws: “The constitutional 
command,” the Eldred Court stated, “is that Congress, to the extent it enacts copyright 
laws at all, create a system that ‘promotes the Progress of Science.’”118
The Court’s statement in Eldred provides no guidance regarding how judges are to 
determine whether one of Congress’s copyright enactments fails to promote progress.  
Nonetheless, even the bare statement in Eldred undercuts previous views that the 
“promote . . . Progress” language is merely a statement of purpose that functions neither 
as part of the congressional power, nor as a limitation of it.119  More importantly, the 
Court’s statement in Eldred aligns its reading of the clause in the copyright context with 
its long-established approach in patent cases.  In the patent context, the Court has long 
117
 See, e.g., David P. Currie, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST 
PERIOD, 1789-1801 93 (1997) (clause confers “not a general power ‘to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts’, but instead only the power to grant limited exclusive 
rights to accomplish that goal”).
118
 537 U.S. at 212 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
119
 See Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (introductory language 
does not limit congressional power); Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult 
Theatre, 604 F.2d 852, 860 (5th Cir. 1979) (same); Melville B. Nimmer & David 
Nimmer, 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 1.03 at 1-88 (promote progress phrase “is in the main 
explanatory of the purpose of copyright, without in itself constituting a rigid standard 
against which any copyright act must be measured”).  Cf. Twentieth Century Music Corp. 
v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (Suggesting, in dicta, that the “promote . . . Progress” 
language may inform the meaning of otherwise ambiguous statutory language: “When 
technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be 
construed in light of [its] basic purpose.”).
Reform(aliz)ing Copyright Draft 03/25/04
34
held that the “promote . . . Progress” language imposes a judicially enforceable constraint 
on Congress’s power.120
If the Supreme Court has left basic questions of textual interpretation unsettled, it has 
been relatively clear and consistent on an even more basic interpretive issue raised by the 
Intellectual Property Clause: the theoretical foundation of intellectual property rights.  It 
has long been established—at least at the level of judicial rhetoric—that copyright is not 
a natural right, but one created by positive law.121
a.  Wheaton v. Peters
The Supreme Court established that principle in the 1834 case of Wheaton v. 
Peters.122  In that case, Wheaton, the first reporter of decisions of the Supreme Court, 
sued Peters, his successor, alleging that a set of condensed volumes of Supreme Court 
opinions (Wheaton’s Reports) that Peters had published infringed Wheaton’s copyrights.  
In opposition, Peters pointed out that Wheaton could not assert a valid copyright in the 
Court’s opinions, which is what Peters had re-published.123 The Court agreed with 
Peters,124 and could simply have dismissed Wheaton’s case on this ground.  But it dealt 
with this potentially dispositive issue in the last paragraph of its opinion, choosing instead 
to focus on the much more difficult alternative defenses Peters had raised: (1) that 
Wheaton could only claim copyright in his published works under federal law, as the 
right did not exist at common law,125 and (2) that Wheaton’s failure to timely deposit his 
volumes with the Secretary of State, and to give public notice in a newspaper of that 
120
 See Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 
(1951) (Douglas and Black, JJ., concurring) (“Congress acts under the restraint imposed 
by the statement of purpose in Art. I, s 8.”); Graham, 383 U.S. at 5-6 (“Congress in the 
exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated 
constitutional purpose.”).
121
 For a comprehensive summary of the natural rights, utilitarian, communitarian, and 
other theories of intellectual property, see Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual 
Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MORAL, LEGAL AND INTERNATIONAL DILEMMAS
107 (Moore ed. 1997).  
122
 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657 (1834).  But see Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two 
Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 147 Revue 
Internationale du Droit D’Auteur 125 (1991).
123
 33 U.S. at 619.
124
 Id. at 668.
125
 Id. at 625.
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deposit, vitiated any copyright he might otherwise hold under the copyright acts of 1790 
and 1802.126
The Court upheld both of Peters’ defenses, holding that the author’s copyright in his 
published works is created by statute and does not exist at common law. 127  Wheaton 
argued that the use of the phrase “securing . . . exclusive rights” in the Intellectual 
Property Clause and “securing [to authors] the copies of maps, charts and books” in the 
founding copyright statute indicated that both the Constitution and the 1790 Act were 
“securing” to authors a right that already existed at common law, and that continued to 
exist.128  The Court rejected that argument: both the clause and the 1790 Act, the Court 
stated, refer to inventions (i.e., patents) as well as literary works, and “it has never been 
pretended, by any one, either in this country or in England, that an inventor has a 
perpetual right, at common law, to sell the thing invented.”129  Neither the clause nor the 
1790 Act provided any reason to distinguish between the source of the exclusive right for 
inventions versus literary works.  The Court also found, in a passage notable more for its 
forcefulness than its logic, that the language of the 1790 Act established that Congress 
was creating a right, not sanctioning an existing one:
That Congress, in passing the act of 1790, did not legislate in reference to 
existing rights, appears clear, from the provision that the author, &c ‘shall 
have the sole right and liberty of printing’, &c.  Now if this exclusive right 
existed at common law, and Congress were about to adopt legislative 
provisions for its protection, would they have used this language?  Could 
they have deemed it necessary to vest a right already vested.  Such a 
presumption is refuted by the words above quoted, and their force is not 
lessened by any other part of the act.130
Having found that copyright in published works was a right created by statute, the 
Court held that non-compliance with the statutory pre-requisites—including those, such 
as deposit and notice, performed subsequent to publication—vitiates the copyright:
[T]he inquiry is made, shall the non performance of these subsequent 
conditions operate as a forfeiture of the right?
126
 Id. at 634.
127
 Id. at 657 (“The argument that a literary man is as much entitled to the product of his 
labor as any other member of society, cannot be controverted.  And the answer is, that he 
realizes this product by the transfer of his manuscripts, or in the sale of his works, when 
first published.”).
128
 Id. at 660-61.
129
 Id. at 661.
130
 Id. at 661.
Reform(aliz)ing Copyright Draft 03/25/04
36
The answer is, that this is not a technical grant of precedent and 
subsequent conditions.  All the conditions are important; the law requires 
them to be performed; and, consequently, their performance is essential to 
a perfect title.131
Facing an incomplete factual record, the Court remanded to the circuit court for a 
determination whether Wheaton had complied with the deposit and notice formalities.132
b.  Utilitarian Copyright
If the Supreme Court in Wheaton v. Peters made clear that copyright is established by 
law, rather than merely enforced by it, then the obvious question is for what purpose has 
the right been established?  Uniquely among the legislative powers enumerated in Article 
I, section 8, the Intellectual Property Clause ties the power to grant patents and copyrights 
to a specified purpose—the promotion of progress in “science” (by which the framers 
meant all forms of knowledge, including literature and the arts), and the “useful arts” (by 
which the framers meant patentable inventions).  The justification for copyright (and 
patent) set out in the clause is utilitarian: Congress is authorized to create exclusive rights 
not as an end in itself, but merely as a means of “promoting progress”.  The creation of 
exclusive rights will induce investment in literary, artistic and scientific work, by, as 
Abraham Lincoln put it, “add[ing] the fuel of interest to the fire of genius.”133   Whether 
granting exclusive rights is the means best suited to that end is one of the large questions 
that has produced an interesting debate but is left aside in this Article.  
In its occasional encounters with the Intellectual Property Clause, the Supreme Court 
has spoken in the utilitarian language of incentives and access—though, as Stewart Sterk 
has pointed out, the Court’s rhetoric has not been entirely consistent.134  In United States 
v. Paramount Pictures, the Court wrote that “[t]he copyright law, like the patent statutes, 
makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration . . . .  It is said that reward to the 
author or artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative 
genius.” 135  In Mazer v. Stein, the Court wrote that “[t]he economic philosophy behind 
the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public 
131
 33 U.S. at 664-65.
132
 Id. at 667.
133 Abraham Lincoln, Lectures on Discoveries and Inventions (Jacksonville, IL, Feb. 11, 
1859), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 10-11 (Don E. 
Fehrenbacher, ed., 1989).
134
 See Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1197,
1203 (1996); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“[S]acrificial days devoted to 
such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.”).  
135
 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
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welfare through the talents of authors and inventors . . . .” 136  In Sony Corp. v. Universal 
City Studios,137 the Court wrote that the exclusive rights granted under the copyright laws 
“are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit.  Rather, 
the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved.  It is 
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a 
special reward.”138
So at least at a high level of generality—i.e., in the Supreme Court’s obiter dicta on
copyright’s overall purpose—American copyright law has been set on a utilitarian 
foundation.  This model constructs copyright as a creature of positive law, by which 
exclusive rights (limited, in their application, by the express constraints set out in the 
Intellectual Property Clause) may be offered, or withheld, on whatever basis is rationally 
calculated to benefit the public.  Congress, too, has often spoken in the same language: 
in, for example, this précis of utilitarian copyright from a legislative report on the 
Copyright Act of 1909:139
The enactment of Copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the 
Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his 
writings, for the Supreme Court has held that such rights as he has are 
purely statutory rights, but upon the ground that the welfare of the public 
will be served and progress of science and the useful arts will be promoted 
by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their 
writings.  The Constitution does not establish copyrights, but provides that 
Congress shall have the power to grant such rights if it thinks best.  Nor 
primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the 
public, such rights are given . . . .  
In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider . . . two questions: 
First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit 
the public, and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be 
detrimental to the public.  The granting of such exclusive rights, under the 
proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that 
outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly.140
136
 347 U.S. at 219.
137
 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
138
 See also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The 
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an author’s creative 
labor.  But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the 
general public good.”).    
139
 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (repealed 1976) (hereinafter referred to as “1909 Act”).
140 (H. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d sess.).  Almost a century earlier, Thomas 
Jefferson expressed the same idea with characteristic felicity:
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D.  Copyright’s Increasingly Uneasy Fit With the Constitution
 If our copyright system were driven purely by the utilitarian tenor of the Intellectual 
Property Clause, rather than by more concrete political considerations,141 we would 
expect our copyright term to be relatively short and formalities to permeate the law.  But 
while Congress and the courts have paid lip service to utilitarian copyright, they have, on 
a practical level, acquiesced to developments in the law—including the move from 
conditional to unconditional copyright, the broadening of the rights granted by copyright 
to cover nearly every conceivable use of the protected work (including the production of 
derivative works), and the extension of the term to a point that the return to rightsholders 
is indistinguishable from that produced by perpetual copyright—that together have made 
our theoretically utilitarian system almost indistinguishable from continental European 
systems that are based on an author’s natural rights.142
The pressing question at this point, given the Supreme Court’s recent holding in 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, is, of course, “So what?”.  Given the Eldred Court’s willingness to 
cede to Congress the task of reconciling the copyright laws to the demands of both the 
Intellectual Property Clause and the First Amendment, there seems to be little prospect 
that the judiciary will arrest copyright’s drift away from its utilitarian moorings.  
And yet, embedded in the majority’s opinion in Eldred is a phrase that shows that a 
sudden collision between the copyright laws and the Constitution is still quite possible.  
The Court repelled petitioners’ First Amendment claim by holding that “when … 
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of 
exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, 
which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to 
himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession 
of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar 
character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other 
possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives 
instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at 
mine, receives light without darkening me . . . . 
Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property. Society may 
give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an 
encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this 
may or may not be done, according to the will and convenience of the 
society, without claim or complaint from anybody.  
Letter, Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813) in THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, XIII (A. A. Lipscomb et al., eds. 1903), 335.
141 See generally Posner & Landes, supra note ___, at ch. 15 (discussing the political 
economy of intellectual property law).
142
 See Paul Goldstein, I Copyright § 1.13.2, at pp. 1:35-1:36 (2d ed. 2000).
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Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First 
Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.”143   The Court is making a historical claim about 
what the “traditional contours” of copyright have been, and is asserting that because 
copyright has remained largely within these original metes and bounds, nothing has 
happened to disturb the Founders’ original conception that copyright is consistent with 
the First Amendment.  The Court did much the same in turning away petitioners’ 
Intellectual Property Clause challenge: “Congress’s unbroken practice since the founding 
generation [of extending both new and subsisting copyrights] overwhelms petitioners’ 
argument that the CTEA’s extension of existing copyright fails per se to ‘promote the 
Progress of Science.’”144  “[A] page of history,” the Court said, “is worth a volume of 
logic.”145
History may indeed surpass logic as a useful tool in legal analysis, but neither method 
is particularly useful if you get the basic facts wrong.146  The “traditional contours” of 
copyright have not been altered as much as they have been obliterated—by, among other 
developments, our recent transition from conditional to unconditional copyright.  Before 
1976, copyright applied to a minority of works; it now applies to all.  Before 1976, the 
effective copyright term for the large majority of works was 28 years; today copyright 
imposes a uniform term lasting, on average, three times as long.  Considering the distance 
our law has traveled in the evolution from conditional to unconditional copyright it is 
difficult, at this point, to understand which of copyright’s “traditional contours” the Court 
believes remain.    
So it is not enough to look, as the Court did in Eldred, at the copyright term in 
isolation.  When one looks more closely at the effects of a series of seemingly minor 
changes to the copyright law (changes that are unrelated (or at least not facially related) 
to the copyright term), it is clear that the “traditional contours” of our copyright system 
went through a disjunction during the move from conditional to unconditional copyright.  
143
 537 U.S. at 221.
144
 Id. at 213-14.
145
 537 U.S. at 200 (citing New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
146
 Unfortunately, the Court’s First Amendment logic is no better than its history.  The 
Court errs by downplaying the First Amendment concern, stating that the inquiry is less 
exacting where “speakers assert the right to make other people’s speeches,” rather than 
their own.  Id. at 220.  But characterizing the claim as “a right to make other people’s 
speeches” misses the core free speech issue posed by copyright extension.  The Court 
frames the issue as focused on pure copying.  Much more important is the right to engage 
in transformative use—i.e., to employ some elements of another’s speech for the purpose 
of building one’s own speech.  This kind of appropriation and “re-mixing” is a common 
way that speech is constructed in our culture.
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Eldred may temporarily have removed the judiciary from some elements of the 
copyright debate, but it has not removed the Intellectual Property Clause from the 
Constitution.  U.S. copyright is—unlike in any other nation—tied at a constitutional level 
to the utilitarian premise.147  That fact limits our choices in terms of what kind of 
copyright system we construct, and there is a powerful case to be made, even post-
Eldred, that copyright has already drifted too far.  It may be difficult at the moment to see 
exactly how the increasing detachment of U.S. copyright law from its constitutional 
underpinnings could lead to judicial intervention and invalidation of elements of the law.  
Here are two possible arguments that have been advanced in a lawsuit filed recently in 
the U.S. district court, Kahle v. Ashcroft:148
1.  Term Extension Without Renewal Filter  
Copyright’s potential collision with the Constitution could take the form of an 
Intellectual Property Clause challenge to copyright extension that is somewhat 
narrower—but no less potentially disruptive to the status quo—than that posed in Eldred.  
The argument urges a re-evaluation of the historical record, based on an observation 
about the effect of the renewal formality on copyright extensions that was never raised in 
Eldred.  
While Congress has extended the term of subsisting copyrights on several occasions 
prior to the CTEA, in every case before the CTEA, the subsisting copyrights whose terms 
were extended had all passed at some point through the filter of a renewal requirement. 
Never were terms extended except in the context of works that had been renewed to get 
the benefit of an extended term.  Never, prior to the CTEA, were terms extended for 
subsisting works except for those works for which the fact of renewal established 
continuing commercial value—the only condition under which copyright extension could 
be said to benefit a rightsholder.
The Act of 1831 extended the initial term of subsisting copyrights from 14 to 28 
years, but within a regime that required copyright owners to renew their copyright to 
secure the benefits of the maximum term of 42 years.149  The Act of 1909 likewise 
extended the renewal term of subsisting copyrights, but the act expressly limited its effect 
to works that had been renewed.150  Even the Copyright Act of 1976, which began the 
147
 Although the constitutions of several nations contain explicit authorizations for 
legislative creation of intellectual property rights (see, e.g., Constitution of Australia, 
Chap. 1, Part V, Section 51(xviii)), these provisions lack a limiting statement of purpose 
analogous to the “promote progress” language in the U.S. Intellectual Property Clause.  
148
 See supra at note ___.  The author is co-counsel for plaintiffs in this lawsuit.
149
 See supra at text accompanying notes ____.
150
 See supra at text accompanying notes ____.
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march toward unconditional copyright and again extended the term of subsisting 
copyrights, limited its extension to works that had been renewed.151
Thus, every extension of subsisting copyrights prior to the CTEA conditioned the 
maximum copyright term upon the copyright holder satisfying a renewal requirement.  In 
contrast, the CTEA’s 20-year extension of subsisting copyrights was granted 
indiscriminately. But because the renewal requirement survived in American law until the 
Berne Convention Implementation Act removed renewal entirely in 1992, the effect of 
this extension differed dramatically depending upon the period during which the initial 
copyright was granted.
• For registered works published between January 1, 1923 and December 31, 
1963, CTEA extended the term of any subsisting copyright by 20 years. But 
because the average renewal rate for work published between 1923 and 1926 
was just 15%, 85% of the work originally copyrighted during that period had 
already passed into the public domain. Thus, while CTEA extended the terms 
of subsisting copyrights, the filter of renewal had already eliminated the vast
majority of copyrights granted during this period from the burden of copyright 
regulation.  The burdens of copyright regulation, therefore, were visited only 
on those works that had passed through the renewal filter—i.e., only those 
works for which continuing protection could be expected to provide some 
return for the author to offset the social costs imposed by continued 
exclusivity.
• For registered works published between January 1, 1964 and December 31, 
1978, CTEA extended the term of subsisting copyrights by 20 years. But 
because the BCIA had granted an automatic renewal to all subsisting 
copyrights not yet in their renewal term, CTEA extended the copyright term 
of a class of works of which, according to historical data, approximately 85% 
would never have been renewed.  In contrast to the situation described above, 
the CTEA visited the burdens of copyright protection on all works from our 
recent past, including the majority that would not have passed through the 
renewal filter.  As a consequence, for a large percentage of these works, costs 
were imposed without the promise of any offsetting benefit. 
2.  Formalities as a Buffer Between Copyright and the First Amendment
In addition to the narrowed Intellectual Property Clause challenge, plaintiffs in Kahle 
press a related First Amendment attack.  The Eldred Court rejected petitioners’ First 
Amendment claim based on a conclusion that the CTEA “ha[d] not altered the traditional 
contours of copyright protection . . . .”  But “the traditional contours of copyright 
protection” in America established a conditional copyright regime. Copyrights were 
151
 See supra at text accompanying notes ____.
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granted, and maintained, only if rights holders took affirmative steps to secure their 
rights.  
These “traditional contours of copyright protection” served important First 
Amendment interests. By requiring copyright owners to signal a desire to continue the 
protection of copyright, the traditional requirement of renewal limited copyright to just 
those works whose owners had a sufficient continuing interest in restricting use of the 
work.  Other works were available for public use in creating new speech.  Likewise, the 
registration and notice requirements provided clarity by identifying copyright holders and 
the term of protection, thus facilitating the spread of knowledge through use of public 
domain material and licensing of works still under copyright. Like the doctrine of “fair 
use,” these structural limitations on the scope of copyright’s regulation narrowly tailored 
the reach of the law to those contexts within which the regulation would act as an “engine 
of free expression.”152  It likewise excluded copyright from those contexts within which 
the regulation would simply act as a brake on free expression. 
These changes to the copyright laws, as they are applied to and affect a large volume 
of creative work that would never have had its copyright renewed, do not advance any 
legitimate government interest.  They instead impose substantial burdens on speech 
without advancing the only legitimate interest the government might have—namely, to 
continue returns to rightsholders in the small minority of work that continues to have 
commercial value, in the hope of maximizing incentives to produce creative work.153  In 
particular, with respect to works created after January 1, 1964, and before January 1, 
1978, these changes have imposed an unconstitutional burden on speech. The term for 
work created between January 1, 1964 and December 31, 1977 was extended by 19 years 
by the Copyright Act of 1976. The term was then automatically renewed by the BCIA in 
1992. Finally, the term was unconditionally extended by 20 years by the CTEA in 1998. 
Thus, even though historical data suggests that more than 85% of this work would never 
have had its copyright renewed, the law has automatically extended the term for all of 
152
 Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545 (1985).  
153
 Petitioners in Eldred argued that, unlike in the case of prospective term extension, 
extension of subsisting copyrights could not possibly contribute to increased incentive to 
invest in the creation of new works—because existing works cannot be created anew, it 
makes no sense to throw additional money at owners of subsisting copyrights.  The 
response of the Eldred majority to this common-sense observation is perhaps the weakest 
part of its opinion: given Congress’s repeated extensions of both new and subsisting 
copyrights, the Court asserted, authors could reasonably expect to receive “a copyright 
not only for the time in place when protection is gained, but also for any renewal or 
extension legislated during that time.”  537 U.S. at 214-215.  But given that the pre-
CTEA copyright term of life of the author plus 50 years already provided a return to the 
rightsholder that approached 100% of the net present value of a perpetual term, see above 
at text accompanying notes ___, it makes no sense to maintain that extension of 
subsisting copyrights provides any additional inducement to authors.     
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this work by 67 years.  This is the first category of copyrighted works in U.S. history 
which has had its term extended automatically without ever passing through the filter of 
renewal.  
Because these changes have altered the “traditional contours” of copyright, they 
should be evaluated under heightened First Amendment scrutiny. But even under the less 
exacting rational basis standard, the burdens created by these changes for certain 
categories of copyrighted work far outweigh any plausible benefits.
E. Unconditional Copyright and U.S. Accession to the Berne Convention  
The move from conditional to unconditional copyright is bad intellectual property 
policy.  It also threatens to bring copyright into conflict with the Constitution.  So what 
possessed us to do it?  There were many factors, including gripes about the difficulties of 
complying with formalities that were often badly administered by the Copyright Office 
and the severe consequences (i.e., loss of copyright protection) arising from failure to 
comply.154  But far the primary reason for the removal of copyright formalities was the 
desire, on the part of the content industries and their supporters in Congress, to accede—
more than a century after its promulgation—to the Berne Convention for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works.
1. The Berne Convention
The Berne Convention, which dates from 1886, was the fruit of negotiations that had 
been proceeding since the first International Congress of Authors and Artists met in 
Brussels in 1858.155  In its current form,156 the Berne Convention obliges signatories to 
honor two basic principles: (1) a “national treatment” principle obliging all signatory 
nations to grant the same rights to foreign authors that they grant to their own authors; 
154
 See, e.g., Statement of Abraham L. Kamenstein, Register of Copyrights, before the 
Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, S. 1006 (89th Cong., 1st 
Sess.) (Aug. 18, 1965).
155
 See generally, Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright: From a Bundle of National 
Copyright Laws to a Supranational Code, 47 J. Copyright Soc’y USA 265 (2000).
156
 The Berne Convention has been revised repeatedly; particular revisions are referred to 
as “Acts”.  The group of countries that are signatories to the Convention, referred to 
collectively as the “Berne Union”, has an existence separate from any particular Act.  
When the Convention is revised, Union members are not required to adhere to the new 
revision as a condition to remaining within the Union.  Similarly, a country may join the 
Union at any time by acceding to the most recent version of the Convention.  The treaty 
obligations of any particular Union member is measured by the terms of the particular 
Act or Acts to which that member has acceded.  See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL 
COPYRIGHT 20-21 (Oxford, 2001).
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and (2) a “baseline protection” principle obliging signatory countries to adhere in their 
domestic law to certain minimum levels of protection as specified in the Convention.157
The Convention’s baseline requirements include a copyright term for works by individual 
authors of life of the author plus 50 years,158 and a prohibition on formalities that affect 
that “enjoyment and exercise” of copyright.159
In 1886, when the Convention was first promulgated, the United States had not 
entered into a single copyright-related international agreement.  U.S. entry into the 
international copyright system began in 1891-92, when it concluded the first of a series of 
bilateral copyright agreements with France,160 the United Kingdom,161 and Germany.162
In 1955, the U.S. acceded to the Universal Copyright Convention, an instrument that 
established multilateral copyright relations between signatories to the Berne Convention 
and other nations, including the United States, that considered the Berne Convention’s 
minimum standards incompatible with domestic law.  As a measure to accommodate the 
United States, the UCC allowed member states to impose formalities as a condition of 
protection.163
The United States did not accede to the Berne Convention until 1989, and the 
Convention’s prohibition of formalities is perhaps the primary reason that the United 
States, alone among industrialized nations, remained outside the Convention for its first 
century.  Nonetheless, many U.S. authors secured the Convention’s benefits prior to U.S. 
accession by simultaneously publishing their work in Canada, a Berne signatory.164  And 
as Graeme Austin has noted, “[a]doption of this practice by American authors wealthy or 
sophisticated enough to do so ensured that many of the benefits of the Convention 
157
 Berne Convention, 1971 Paris Text, Art. 5(1).  Under the Berne Convention’s “points 
of attachment” rules, a work is entitled to Berne Convention protection in signatory 
nations if its author is a national or domiciliary of a signatory state (see Berne 
Convention, 1971 Paris Text, Art. 3(I)(a), (2)), or if the work is first or simultaneously 
published in a signatory state (see Berne Convention, 1971 Paris Text, Art. 3(I)(b)).
158
 Berne Convention, 1971 Paris Text, Art. 7(1).
159
 Id. at Art. 5(2). 
160
 Bilateral Agreement of July 1, 1891, 27 Stat. 981 (Proclamation No. 3).
161
 Id.
162
 Bilateral Agreement of April 15, 1892, 27 Stat. 1021 (Proclamation No. 24).
163
 Universal Copyright Convention, 1952 Geneva Text., Art. I.
164
 Austin, supra note __, at 42.
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accrued to American copyright industries.  American society, however, shouldered few of 
its burdens.”165
2.  Berne’s Rule Against Formalities
Curiously, the Berne Convention allowed formalities at its inception, providing that 
enjoyment of the rights prescribed by the Convention were subject “to the 
accomplishment of conditions and formalities prescribed by law in the country of origin 
of the work.”166  By 1908, however, the Convention had been amended to provide that 
member countries must not condition the acquisition, exercise, or enjoyment of copyright 
protection for the works of foreign authors on the observance of any formality.167
The current version of the Convention’s prohibition against formalities is set out in 
Article 5(2) of the 1971 Paris Act, which provides that 
The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any 
formality; such enjoyment and exercise shall be independent of the 
existence of protection in the country of the origin of the work.  
Consequently, apart from the provisions of this Convention, the extent of 
protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the author to protect 
his rights, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the country where 
protection is claimed.168
The term “formality” is not defined, but is understood in the sense of an 
administrative obligation set out in a national law that imposes a condition necessary for 
a copyright to exist, or for the right to continue or to be practically available.169  Those 
provisions of U.S. law that provide for voluntary formalities—i.e., voluntary notice, 
registration, recordation of transfers—and that provide incentives for compliance,170
either apply only to U.S. works (for example, in the case of the bar on bringing 
infringement litigation absent registration, which was believed to negate the right to 
165
 Id.  This “back door” to Berne has, since 1914, been subject to the power of Union 
members to retaliate against authors who are nationals of non-Union countries but obtain 
Berne protection through first publication in a Union country, if the author’s country of 
nationality “fails to protect in an adequate manner the works of authors who are nationals 
of one of the countries of the Union.”  Berne Convention, 1971 Paris Text, Art. 6(1).
166
 Berne Convention, 1886 Art. II(2).
167
 Berne Convention, 1908 Berlin Text, Art. 4(2).
168
 Berne Convention Art. 5(2).
169
 W.I.P.O. Guide to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary Works (Paris 
Act 1971) at 33.
170
 See supra at text accompanying notes ____.  
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“exercise” the copyright and thus to qualify as a prohibited formality under Berne)171 or 
are not the type of formality that Berne prohibits.172
Importantly, although the terms of Article 5(2) bar the imposition of formalities on 
foreign authors, signatory nations remain free to impose formalities on the works of their 
own nationals.  As the World Intellectual Property Organization’s official exegesis of the 
Convention explains, the freedom from formalities provided by the Convention “exists 
independently of any protection that the work enjoys in its country of origin.  In fact, 
such country remains absolutely free to subordinate the existence or exercise of the rights 
on that work in that country to such conditions or formalities as it thinks fit: it is purely a 
matter of domestic law.”173  U.S. accession to Berne, therefore, did not require the 
wholesale removal of mandatory registration, notice and recordation of transfers.  Rather, 
the application of these mandatory formalities could simply have been limited to the 
works of U.S. authors, which, as we have seen, comprise a large majority of works 
published in the U.S.174  Voluntary registration and notice formalities, and the current 
system of inducements to compliance, could have been established for the works of 
foreign authors.     
In contrast, Berne accession did, for all practical purposes, require the removal of 
mandatory renewal for both U.S. and foreign works.  Article 7(1) of Berne prescribes a 
171
 See STEPHEN M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS
106 (1983) (“[T]he necessity to register before bringing an action would probably be 
regarded as a ‘formality’ as it negates the ‘exercise’ of the right without such 
registration.”); Mayer Gabay, The United States Copyright System and the Berne 
Convention, 26 Bull. Copyright Soc’y 202, 208 (1979) (“It is true that registration is 
‘permissive’ and does not, under the 1976 Act, constitute a condition precedent for 
acquisition of copyright.  But these factors merely give rise to a bare right that is 
incapable of being exercised in a U.S. court of law until registration is effected.”).
172
 The fact that registration affords successful infringement plaintiffs the opportunity to 
collect statutory damages and attorneys fees, for example, is not believed to violate the 
Berne Convention because that instrument does not itself require that a country provide 
for such recoveries.  See Gabay, supra note ___, at 209-10; Melville Nimmer, 
Implications of the Prospective Revisions of the Berne Convention and the United States 
Copyright Law, 19 Stan. L. Rev. 499, 514 (1967).
173 GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION, World Intellectual Property Organization, § 5.6.  
WIPO, one of the 16 specialized agencies of the United Nations system of organizations, 
is the principle forum for negotiation of international intellectual property agreements.  
Headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, WIPO administers 23 international treaties 
dealing with different aspects of intellectual property protection. The Organization counts 
179 nations as member states.  For more information on WIPO’s mission, see 
<http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/dgo/pub487.htm>.
174
 See supra at text accompanying notes ____.
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minimum term of protection for the works of individual authors of life of the author plus 
50 years.  So even a longer term was contemplated, its continuation could not be 
conditioned on renewal until expiration of the very long minimum term.  Similarly for 
anonymous or pseudonymous works, Article 7(3) of Berne prescribes a minimum term of 
50 years; continuation of the term could be conditioned on renewal only after that.  And, 
importantly, mandatory renewal, even if imposed at a point that does not conflict with 
Berne’s minimum terms, could be applied only to the works of U.S. authors: Berne’s 
prohibition of mandatory formalities would permit the imposition of only a voluntary re-
registration procedure for the works of foreign authors.  (Because the copyright term 
would remain unitary and there is no possibility of loss of rights for failure to renew, it 
doesn’t make sense to speak of voluntary “renewal”; indeed, the only purpose of re-
registration would be to create a fresh record of ownership, rather than to move 
commercially exhausted works into the public domain.)  
Given these limitations, maintaining any renewal provision, whether mandatory or 
voluntary, is not worth the trouble.  Under the Berne minima, assuming an average life 
span of 35 years after creation of a work, more than 85 years will have passed before 
most copyrights could be subject to mandatory or voluntary renewal.  By that point—as 
the discussion above at pp. ___ shows—more than 99% of works will long have been 
commercially exhausted, and so there is no inducement that could cause any substantial 
number of rightsholders to invest in compliance with renewal or re-registration.  
Although the minimum period is somewhat shorter—50 years—for anonymous and 
pseudonymous works, the data on the rate of copyright depreciation, discussed above at 
pp. ____, suggest that more than 90% of works will have lost all value in this period, thus 
making any renewal or re-registration formality largely, if not wholly, meaningless.  
3.  Berne’s “Practical Hostility” to Formalities
Why does the Berne Convention prohibit formalities?  The response most often has 
been made at the level of copyright theory; i.e., that formalities are out of step with 
natural rights theory of copyright, which has been characterized as the “Grundnorm” of 
the Berne Convention.175
That explanation is deeply unsatisfying, for the degree to which formalities are 
inconsistent with natural rights-based copyright is easily overstated.  Even the nations of 
continental Europe, whose copyright systems are most closely identified with a natural 
rights framework, do not provide for perpetual copyright,176 and have never done so.  
175
 Alan Story, Burn Berne: Why the Leading International Copyright Convention Must 
Be Repealed, 40 Houston L. Rev. 763, 771 (2003).  See also SAM RICKETSON, THE 
BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-
1986, at 93 (1987) (“Authors’ rights . . . remain at the centre of the international 
framework.”).  
176
 The European Union has, by a 1996 EU Directive, required member nations to adopt a 
uniform life-plus-70 term.  The EU term has become the global benchmark, has been 
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Consequently, even in so-called “natural rights” systems, copyrights expire, works enter 
the public domain, and the law therefore must seek some form of “utilitarian” balance 
between private incentives and public access.  Indeed, even in a notional system that 
imposes a perpetual copyright, requiring registration and notice would nonetheless be a 
sensible step.  As has been detailed above, a reliable and easily accessed ownership 
registry encourages transfers and licensing by lowering the cost to the would-be 
transferee or licensee of identifying rightsholders.  A system focused on returns to 
authors should therefore seek to maximize authors’ rewards with modest investments in 
administrative mechanisms, such as a registry, that reduce transaction costs.
Again, there is no sharp disjunction between “natural rights” and “utilitarian” 
copyright systems in the manner one would expect if copyright was driven by theory 
rather than exigency.  The primary difference between the utilitarian and natural rights 
approaches is which side of the balance is emphasized.  So formalities could play an 
important role in any system of limited-term copyrights in maximizing copyright’s social 
utility by focusing protection.    
So how are we to explain Berne’s aversion to formalities?  The simplest and best 
explanation is much more prosaic than the one commonly offered.  The overarching 
purpose of the Berne Convention is to provide protection to authors whose works will be 
published in many countries.  Perhaps the most practically important element of that 
protection—more important for the protection of authors’ interests than establishing a 
minimum copyright term—is to avoid the necessity that authors comply with mandatory 
formalities in every country in which their works are published or may be found.  Berne’s 
proscription of mandatory formalities is a rational response to the difficulty of complying 
(and maintaining compliance) with differently-administered formalities that may have 
been, absent the Convention, imposed in dozens of national systems, some with 
registries, some without, and none of which share information.      
This observation is helpful in better understanding the Berne Convention, but, more 
usefully for our purposes here, it also has important implications for the status of 
formalities in U.S. copyright law.  In deciding whether a particular formality interferes 
with the “enjoyment and . . . exercise” of copyright, and thereby runs afoul of Article 5(2) 
of the Convention, it is important that Berne’s anti-formality principle does not arise from 
any supposed foundational incompatibility between formalities and an authors’ rights 
copyright framework, but flows instead from the practical desire to relieve authors from 
the likelihood that the difficulty of complying with mandatory formalities in many 
jurisdictions will swamp the potential gains from international distribution, or, in the 
worst case, lead to the forfeiture of valuable rights.  
cited as a factor in the CTEA’s installment of an identical term in U.S. law, Eldred, 537 
U.S. at 195-96, and is now reflected in domestic legislation in Switzerland, Brazil, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Israel, Hungary, Paraguay, Peru, Romania, Slovenia, and Turkey. 
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We will turn now to consider how formalities may be reintroduced into the U.S. 
system, in light both of the problems that Berne was trying to solve, and technological 
developments that now allow much less burdensome approaches to solving the same 
problems.       
III. REFORMALIZING COPYRIGHT 
A.  Defining “Interoperable” Formalities in the Berne Convention
Berne’s prohibition of formalities dates from 1908, a time in which requiring authors 
to comply with formalities in the many countries in which a work may be published—
i.e., requiring an author (or publisher) to inform himself about the requirements of the 
law in countries with which he has no familiarity, and then to obtain and fill out forms in 
a variety of languages—would be difficult, expensive, and often result in unintentional 
noncompliance and the loss of valuable rights.  Article 5(2) of the current Paris Text of 
the Berne Convention was promulgated in 1971, but the nature of the problem had not 
changed in the intervening 63 years: copyright systems remained substantively and 
procedurally diverse, the mechanisms of compliance in many countries remained balky, 
and the costs of informing oneself about requirements in different countries, and then in 
complying with them, high.    
Between 1971 and now, however, there has been a series of related technological 
changes that could make compliance with a re-designed set of formalities quick and easy.  
That change is, of course, the rise of computers and the Internet.  Now it is possible for 
an author publishing a work internationally to comply with formalities in his or her home 
country, or in the country of a work’s first publication, and to have the data generated by 
that compliance formatted and transmitted costlessly to permit compliance with 
formalities in other jurisdictions.  But changes to technology alone are not enough—
changes to the law are also required.  To make compliance cheap, the law must ensure 
that data generated in one jurisdiction will be sufficient to permit compliance in any 
jurisdiction that chooses to re-introduce formalities into its domestic copyright laws.
The simplest way to take advantage of what technology now allows would be to 
propose a new Berne text that removes the prohibition in Article 5(2) of the current Paris 
Text177 and replaces it with a provision allowing member countries to impose formalities, 
177
 The North American Free Trade Agreement also contains provisions related to 
intellectual property, see Goldstein, supra note ___, at p. 48.  In particular, NAFTA 
Article 1703(2) mirrors Berne Article 5(2)’s proscription of formalities, and must 
likewise be modified to permit re-formalization of domestic law in the United States, 
Canada and Mexico.  NAFTA Article 1703(2) provides that “[n]o Party may, as a 
condition of according national treatment under this Article, require rights holders to 
comply with any formalities or conditions in order to acquire rights in respect of 
copyright and related rights.”  Since NAFTA signatories Canada, Mexico, and the United 
Reform(aliz)ing Copyright Draft 03/25/04
50
provided that they adhere to a set of standards that make formalities “interoperable” 
across jurisdictions.  What would the changes to the Berne Convention look like?  
1.  The Reciprocity Principle
The most direct approach would install a “reciprocity principle” alongside the 
existing national treatment and minimum standards principles that now drive Berne.  The 
reciprocity principle would require that all Berne jurisdictions that impose formalities 
permit foreign authors to comply with formalities in their national laws by complying 
with formalities either in their home country or in the work’s country of first publication 
or registration.  The reciprocity principle would not require any particular Berne nation to 
impose formalities—i.e., it would not modify Berne’s current minimum standards 
requirements.  It would, rather, require only that Berne nations that choose to re-
formalize their domestic copyright laws do so according to standards set out in Berne.
Some nations may, of course, choose not to re-introduce formalities into their 
domestic law.  But if some Berne Union countries have formalities, and others do not, the 
possibility arises that the home country of an author, or the nation of first publication of 
his work, does not have a registration requirement to which other Berne countries with 
formalities can grant reciprocity.  To accommodate authors in this category who wish to 
comply with formalities across Berne jurisdictions, the Berne nations should also 
establish a centralized WIPO registry, subject to the same standards agreed among Berne 
members, and subject also to the condition that all Berne nations will grant reciprocity.   
To make the reciprocity principle practically workable, Berne signatories would enter 
into a side agreement that would standardize across jurisdictions the data required to 
register a copyright, and standardize formatting of that data so that registration 
information—author(s) name(s) and address(es), creation and registration dates, etc.—
may readily be shared among jurisdictions.  The Berne signatories could then establish an 
information-sharing agreement whereby registration data obtained in one country could 
be made available to other jurisdictions, at the rightsholder’s discretion.  As the 
secretariat for the Berne Union, WIPO would be well-placed to coordinate the actual 
transfer of data among Berne members.
Taking this approach, it is not necessary to amend Berne to prescribe a minimum set 
of formalities.  It would suffice, rather, simply to remove Article 5(2)’s prohibition, to 
install the reciprocity principle, to work out a set of standards to ensure interoperability, 
and then to leave to the member states the decision whether to re-install formalities or 
not.  
2. The Reciprocity Principle and Neighboring Rights Agreements
States are all parties to a text of the Berne Convention that prohibits formalities, NAFTA 
Article 1703(2) is largely duplicative of Berne on the issue of formalities.
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For countries that, unlike the United States, do not include protection for 
performances, sound recordings (also referred to as “phonograms”) and broadcasts in 
their copyright laws, but locate them instead in separate “neighboring rights” statutes, 
reformalization of domestic law must include changes to the law governing both types of 
right.  Similarly, the same reciprocity principle that would be installed into the Berne 
Convention must also be introduced into the applicable international agreements 
governing neighboring rights—an issue of some complexity.  
The principal international agreement defining protection of neighboring rights is the 
1961 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, also known as the Rome Convention.  This 
instrument extends Berne-style national treatment and minimum rights principles to 
neighboring rights, although the minimum terms established are shorter.178  Unlike Berne 
Article 5(2), Article 11 of the Rome Convention does not prohibit signatories from 
conditioning protection of neighboring rights on formalities.  Article 11 provides, 
however, that any signatory that conditions protection for performers on or producers of 
phonograms on compliance with formalities must permit its requirements to be met by 
affixing a prescribed notice to the recording or its container.  Adoption of the reciprocity 
principle, therefore, would require removal of the rule allowing blanket compliance 
through notice with formalities pertaining to protection of phonograms.
The 1973 Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against 
Unauthorized Distribution of Their Phonograms, referred to as the Geneva Phonograms 
Convention, which is aimed at cross-border record piracy, requires signatories to protect 
qualifying phonogram producers “against the making of duplicates without the consent of 
the producer and against the importation of such duplicates, provided that any such 
making or importation is for the purpose of distribution to the public, and against the 
distribution of such duplicates to the public.”179  Like the Rome Convention, the Geneva 
Phonograms Convention allows signatories to impose formalities as a condition of 
protection for phonograms, but provides that affixation of notice must suffice to comply 
with all mandatory formalities.180  Thus, the same changes that would be required to the 
Rome Convention must also be applied to the Geneva Phonograms Convention.
178
 Rome Article 14 establishes minimum 20-year terms for both phonograms and 
performances (measured either from the date of performance (for unfixed performances) 
or from the data of fixation for performance recorded on phonograms).  Article 17 of the 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty and Article 10(1) of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) extend these minimum 
terms to 50 years.  TRIPs Article 14(5) also imposes a minimum 20-year term for 
broadcasts.
179
 Geneva Phonograms Convention, Art. 2.
180
 Id., Art. 5.
Reform(aliz)ing Copyright Draft 03/25/04
52
Now that we have seen what changes to international law are necessary to shift the 
treatment of formalities from hostility (Berne), or at best, grudging acceptance (Rome 
and Geneva), to acceptance with reciprocity, let us briefly examine how such a system 
would work with respect to each of the familiar types of formality.
3.  The Reciprocity Principle in Practice
Registration.  The application of the reciprocity principle to the registration formality 
is comparatively straightforward.  Once a work is registered in one jurisdiction (or with 
the centralized WIPO registry), it would be registered in all Berne Union jurisdictions 
that have re-installed a registration formality in their domestic law.
Recordation of Transfers.  The same scheme established for registration should also 
apply to recordation of transfers—a transfer that is successfully recorded in one 
jurisdiction (or with the Berne registry) should suffice to record that transfer in all 
jurisdictions in which the work previously has been registered.
Notice.  Berne Union nations would be free, under the reciprocity principle, to require 
that notice be given for some or all works.  Of course, if a Berne nation creates an 
effective, easily accessible copyright registry, there is little to be gained by also requiring 
notice—the registry should provide enough information to make tracing of copyright 
ownership simple and cheap.181  In the instance, however, that some Berne signatories 
may choose to include a notice requirement in their re-formalized domestic law, the 
signatories should agree to standardize the form of notice for different types of works to 
ensure (1) that no more information is required to be elicited to comply with notice 
requirements than was supplied to complete registration, and (2) that the same form of 
notice that suffices in one jurisdiction for any particular type of work will also be 
accepted throughout the Berne Union.  These rules would prevent differing standards for 
notice that might cause unintentional loss of rights.  They would also encourage 
publication with the standardized form of notice even in those jurisdictions that do not 
require it as a condition of protection.  
Renewal.  Creating a renewal formality that is interoperable across jurisdictions raises 
a number of somewhat more complex problems, but should be achievable with some 
increased level of coordination among Berne members.  
The first problem is whether, to permit Berne nations to re-install the renewal 
formality, a revised Berne Convention would have to remove the provision in the current 
version of Berne requiring all signatories to grant a minimum copyright term of life of the 
181
 Indeed, because notice on existing works usually cannot be updated, notice can give 
misleading information regarding current ownership.
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author plus fifty years.182  While the question is not free from doubt, a strong argument 
can be made that the minimum term is not inconsistent with a renewal formality imposed 
at some time before the expiry of life-plus-fifty.  Berne’s prohibition of formalities is 
contained in an Article separate from its minimum term requirements.  Remove the 
prohibition of formalities, and there is no other provision in the Convention suggesting 
that full enjoyment of the life-plus-fifty term could not be conditioned on compliance 
with a renewal formality at some point during the term.  It is clear that absent Berne’s 
current prohibition of formalities, Berne members could re-impose a registration 
formality—i.e., could condition the enjoyment of any portion of the minimum term upon 
registration.  Similarly, Berne member states that re-introduce a renewal formality should 
be able to condition enjoyment of some portion of the “minimum” term on compliance 
with the formality.  In both instances, the law would continue to offer a Berne-compliant 
minimum term.  Remove the current ban on formalities, and nothing in the Convention 
specifies that the term, if offered equally to every author, must be enjoyed in full by every 
author without condition.   
The second problem is a more practical one: how to coordinate renewal across 
jurisdictions, when different Berne member states may impose renewal requirements at 
different points in the copyright term.  A simple application of the reciprocity principle 
threatens to create substantial confusion.  If a rightsholder who complies with the renewal 
formality in the jurisdiction in which a work was first registered is deemed to have 
complied with renewal in any jurisdiction in which a renewal is required, then absent 
detailed knowledge of the point at which renewal may be required in a potentially large 
number of Berne jurisdictions, a would-be user will find it difficult to determine whether 
a work has been timely renewed.  
For example, suppose that a work is first registered in country A, which imposes a 
renewal requirement at 30 years into the term.  Twenty-five years into the work’s term, a 
would-be user in country B inquires whether the work is in the public domain.  Country 
B imposes a renewal formality at 15 years.  The user sees that the work was registered 25 
years ago; under country B’s law, the work would have passed into the public domain 
when the rightsholder failed to timely renew.  But under country A’s laws, the work is 
still in its initial term; renewal will not be required for another five years.  Accordingly, 
under a simple application of the reciprocity principle, unless the user understands (1) 
where the work was first registered, (2) when the renewal requirement occurs in that 
jurisdiction, and (3) that country A’s renewal requirement is the relevant one, the user 
will not easily be able to determine whether the work is in the public domain or not.
182
 See Berne, Art. 7(1).   See also Berne, Art. 7(2) (establishing for cinematographic 
works a minimum term of fifty years after publication (or, for unreleased films, fifty 
years after production)); Berne, Art. 7(3) (establishing for anonymous and pseudonymous 
works a minimum term of fifty years after publication); Berne, Art. 7(4) (establishing for 
photographs and works of applied art a minimum term of twenty-five years following a 
work’s production in those countries that protect these types of works).
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These information problems can be mitigated, of course, even if they cannot be 
eliminated.  The standardized registration and notice format should include information 
on the nation of the work’s first registration, and that information should be made 
available in all on-line registry sites maintained in the various Berne nations.  In addition, 
Berne signatories should be encouraged to disseminate information about the rules 
governing renewal, and how to determine which renewal term applies to a particular 
work.  Taken together, these measures might mean that the benefit, in terms of the 
simplicity of a straightforward application of the reciprocity principle to renewal, 
outweighs the cost in terms of the increased complexity of determining the status of 
rights.   
An alternative, which would require a greater degree of coordination among Berne 
nations, would be to standardize renewal terms for all jurisdictions that re-install a 
renewal formality into their domestic law.  The reciprocity principle would then apply to 
grant automatic compliance with all Berne nations’ renewal requirements based on timely 
compliance with the requirement in the country of first registration, or by renewing with 
WIPO, if original registration was made with the WIPO registry.  Based on the 
depreciation calculations made by Landes and Posner, the Berne nations could impose 
more than one renewal obligation during the term.  A first renewal obligation set at 10 
years would move approximately 50% of registered works into the public domain.  A 
second renewal requirement set in the vicinity of 43 years would result in only 10% of 
the number of originally registered works remaining under copyright.  A third renewal 
requirement set at 65 years would move all but 1% of the number of originally registered 
works into the public domain.  The works left under copyright after 65 years would be 
those of truly enduring commercial value, for which the full term of copyright would be 
likely to provide significant continuing benefits.
B. Defining “New-Style” Berne-Compliant Formalities
If changing Berne to explicitly permit formalities is not possible, is there still a way to 
re-formalize U.S. domestic law?  There are several alternatives, of varying merit.  This
section will first briefly discuss two long-shot possibilities—the reintroduction of 
formalities for U.S. (but not for foreign) authors, and U.S. retrocession from Berne.   I 
then focus on an alternative that seems much more sensible—the re-introduction into 
U.S. law of “new-style” formalities that provide the benefits of traditional formalities, but 
that do not run afoul of Berne’s proscription of conditions that interfere with the 
“exercise and enjoyment” of copyright.  
1.  Reintroducing Old-Style Formalities for U.S. Authors
Because Berne does not prevent signatories from imposing formalities on the works 
of domestic authors or authors from non-Berne signatory nations, the U.S. could have 
retained a full set of traditional formalities for those works (which constitute, as has been 
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seen, the large majority of works published in the U.S.).183  In fact, an advisory group 
established by the Department of State to assess what changes to U.S. law would be 
necessary for Berne accession advocated this position, as part of a more broadly 
minimalist approach to implementation of Berne which sought to alter only those 
portions of U.S. law that the group deemed clearly irreconcilable with the Convention.184
The minimalist approach of restricting unconditional copyright to foreign authors is, 
for reasons that are not difficult to imagine (i.e., the antipathy to granting foreign authors 
more rights than U.S. authors), not the approach that we took.  Whether the politics of 
copyright are likely ever to shift in a way that would make the minimalist approach to 
unconditional copyright viable is a question beyond the scope of this Article.  It is worth 
noting, however, that restricting unconditional copyright to foreign works would 
represent a significant improvement on the status quo without any risk of non-compliance 
with Berne.       
2.  Berne Retrocession, and Reliance on Universal Copyright Convention
Because the U.S. is a signatory to the Universal Copyright Convention,185 and 
because before it acceded to Berne it negotiated bilateral copyright agreements with 
several nations that were not UCC signatories,186 it would be possible for the U.S. to end 
its compliance with Berne, and rely instead on the UCC, which, unlike Berne, allows the 
imposition of formalities for the works of both domestic and foreign authors.  
One potential cost to retrocession arises from Berne Article 6(1), which permits 
Berne nations to restrict the protection accorded to works of authors who are nationals of 
a non-Berne country that “fails to protect in an adequate matter the works of [Berne 
nationals].”187  There is little commentary on this provision, so it is difficult to forecast 
whether subjecting foreign works to formalities (at least formalities that do not 
discriminate between domestic and foreign works, and for which compliance is easy and 
cheap) would rise to the level of a “fail[ure] to protect in an adequate manner” the rights 
183
 See supra at text accompanying notes _____.
184
 See Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne 
Convention, 10 Colum-VLA J. of Law & the Arts 513, 622 (1986) (“[W]e have proposed 
what we think are minimal amendments to the law, only where change is clearly required, 
based upon widely shared understandings of Berne obligations . . . .  A number of the 
alternatives we propose for consideration seek to exploit the distinction in treatment 
between works of foreign and national origin permitted by the Berne Convention.”).
185
 See supra at text accompanying notes ____.
186
 See supra at text accompanying notes ____.
187
 Berne, Art. 6(1).
Reform(aliz)ing Copyright Draft 03/25/04
56
of foreign authors.  Even if re-formalization of U.S. copyright would lead to a 
determination that the U.S. had fallen below an “adequate” level of protection, retaliation 
under Article 6(1) likely must be proportional to Berne authors.  
This “nuclear option” is, of course, very unlikely ever to be tried.  That said, it is 
available as a bargaining chip in aid of an effort to enact a revision of Berne that adopts
the reciprocity principle.  
3.  Indefinitely Renewable Copyright
William Landes and Richard Posner have proposed a system of indefinitely 
renewable copyrights—i.e., a perpetual copyright term, conditioned on periodic 
renewal.188 Landes and Posner suggest that such a system would result in more works 
entering the public domain more quickly; their conclusions in this regard are very likely 
correct.  The Landes and Posner proposal is subject, however, to two critiques; the first is 
significant, the second, for my purposes, determinative.  
First, a system of indefinitely renewable copyrights would prevent any work of 
enduring commercial value (many of which would also have important cultural value) 
from ever entering the public domain. For reasons that have been made clear above, 
extending copyright indefinitely for valuable works would raises the cost of 
transformative use of these works, and would give rightsholders a perpetual veto power 
over uses they don’t like.  And these cultural and First Amendment costs are not balanced 
by countervailing benefits.  Because the current regime of limited but very long copyright 
terms gives rightsholders virtually the same return (from a net present value perspective) 
as would be produced under a perpetual term, a shift to perpetual copyright for valuable 
works would yield no significant enhancement to the incentive to create.  
Landes and Posner also discuss a series of limited term options conditioned on 
repeated renewal requirements.  These avoid the first objection, but they do not avoid the 
second: because they employ an old-style renewal formality (i.e., one that results in 
termination of rights for failure to comply), and because none of the proposals would 
guarantee a minimum term of life-plus-fifty, all versions of the Landes and Posner 
approach would require the U.S. to withdraw from the Berne Convention.189  The authors 
make note of the incompatibility of their proposal with Berne,190 but their concerns, 
188
 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 471 (2003); Landes & Posner, supra note ___, at ch. 8.
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 Incompatibility with Berne’s rule against formalities could be avoided, of course, by 
limiting the proposal to works of U.S. authors.  But even such a limitation would not 
prevent incompatibility with the life-plus-fifty minimum term requirement, which applies 
to all works.
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unlike mine, are focused solely on the economic effects of their proposal, and not on the 
consequences of their proposal for U.S. participation in the international copyright 
system.  
4.  The Public Domain Enhancement Act
Another possible approach is set out in a bill currently before Congress, the Public 
Domain Enhancement Act.191  Sponsored by Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA), the PDEA would 
give copyright owners unfettered rights for 50 years after the author's death—thereby 
complying with the Berne Convention’s minimum term requirement. At that point, the 
owners of the works of U.S. authors would be required to file a notice of continuation and 
pay a $1 fee in order to continue the copyright for an additional 20 years.  Because only a 
small number of works would retain any commercial value at the expiry of the minimum 
term, most copyright owners would not bother to file a notice of continuation and pay the 
fee.  On September 4, 2003, the PDEA was referred to the House Subcommittee on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property.  There it has languished.
Unlike the Posner and Landes proposal, the PDEA is not incompatible with Berne.  
The PDEA’s renewal requirement comes only after the completion of the minimum life-
plus-fifty term.  And the requirement is limited to the works of U.S. authors, thereby 
avoiding conflict with Berne’s rule against formalities.
Nonetheless, the PDEA is vulnerable to the critique that its effect is limited to 
tinkering around the margins.  A large percentage of works are commercially valueless at 
inception or have an initial value that is quickly depleted—all of these works, however, 
will continue under the PDEA to be subject to a very long (life-plus-fifty) copyright term.  
While life-plus-fifty is marginally better than life-plus-seventy, it may reasonably be 
asked whether the game is worth the candle.
5. New-Style Formalities
A fifth option, and by far the most attractive, is to formulate and install in U.S. law a 
set of new-style formalities that provide the filtering and information-creation benefits of 
traditional formalities but, because they do not affect copyright’s “enjoyment and 
exercise”, comply with our Berne obligations under the current Paris Text.  This 
approach is attractive because it would require changes only to U.S. law: Berne and the
other international agreements that govern copyright would remain undisturbed.  
Integrating new-style formalities with the current text of the Berne Convention does, 
however, raise several significant questions.  
What, exactly, is a condition that interferes with the “enjoyment and exercise” of 
copyright?  A solid starting point is that the “exercise and enjoyment” language at least 
means that failure to comply with a formality cannot formally terminate the right, or 
191
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prevent it from arising in the first place.  It is unclear how much further “enjoyment and 
exercise” goes than that; I will return to this problem later.  
Assuming for the moment that Article 5(2) allows a range of options short of formal 
nullification of the copyright, we are still faced with a difficult problem—new-style 
formalities have to create a sufficient incentive for compliance to construct a reliable 
record of ownership, and to reliably signal copyright status, but cannot use the forfeiture 
of rights to incent compliance.
a.  Voluntary Formalities Plus Compulsory Licenses
The simplest solution would be to preserve formally voluntary registration, notice, 
and recordation (and re-establish a formally voluntary renewal formality) for all works 
(including works of foreign authors), but then incent compliance by exposing the works 
of non-compliant rightsholders to a compulsory license.  The royalty payable under the 
compulsory license would be low: ideally, the royalty to license a work that a 
rightsholder has failed to register, notice, re-register in the case of a transfer (i.e., record), 
or renew should be set to approximate the cost of complying with these formalities (i.e., 
the total cost of informing oneself about the details of compliance, and then satisfying 
them).  That way, a rightholder who expects his work to produce revenue exceeding the 
cost of complying with the relevant formality will prefer to comply with the formality, 
whereas a rightsholder who expects his work to produce revenue amounting to less than 
the cost of compliance will prefer to expose his work to the compulsory license.  (The 
rare rightsholder who estimates the likely revenues from his work to be equal to the cost 
of complying with the formality will be perfectly indifferent between compliance and 
exposure to the compulsory license.)    
This system of formally voluntary formalities plus compulsory licenses—which I 
have referred to previously, and will hereinafter, as “new-style” formalities—establishes 
indirectly what the traditional system of compulsory formalities did directly: it filters out 
of copyright commercially valueless works for which protection (or the continuation of 
protection) serves no purpose, and restricts copyright to those works for which protection 
is needed to ensure that the rightsholder is able to appropriate the commercial value of 
the expression.  For the filtering function to work, of course, the government would have 
to maintain an easily accessible and up-to-date public registry.  Given current computer 
database and search technology, this will not be difficult.
Importantly, the use of compulsory licenses in a system of new-style formalities 
avoids the general objection to the forced licensing of intellectual property goods—the 
need for a legislature, agency or court to set a price for the license in the absence of 
market negotiations.  With respect to the particular use of compulsory licenses proposed 
here, compliance with the formalities—or, rather, the failure to comply—serves as a price 
signal.  Failure to comply means that the rightsholder places a minimal value on the right, 
a value no greater than the cost of compliance.  That is all we need to know about works 
for which rightsholders fail to comply with formalities.  And by exposing them to the 
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compulsory license, we are giving these rightsholders nothing less than what they 
themselves expect in term of returns.  Exposing the property to a nominally priced 
compulsory license is therefore efficient: the system removes transaction costs that would 
otherwise frequently prevent use, while charging an approximately optimal price (i.e., 
near zero) for a license.  With respect to the other works, the works for which 
rightsholders comply with formalities, the market continues to set the price of a license.
Compulsory licenses can be analogized to the “penalty defaults” of the type proposed 
by Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner as gap-filling rules for incomplete contracts.192  Default 
rules in contract theory are rules that are intended to fill gaps in contracts by providing 
the parties with what they likely would have contracted for.  “Penalty defaults” are gap-
filling rules that are designed to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to 
contract around the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract 
provision they prefer.  Penalty defaults are purposefully designed to impose what the 
parties would not want, in order to encourage the parties to negotiate the solution that 
they do want.  Importantly, penalty defaults incent contracting parties to reveal 
information to one another that might not be revealed otherwise.  
Although Ayres and Gertner formulate and apply their theory of penalty defaults in 
the contract law context, the theory can be applied in the intellectual property context as 
well.  The compulsory licenses that back new-style formalities are a kind of penalty 
default rule, in that they are precisely the outcome that the owner of a valuable copyright 
would not wish.  The existence of the compulsory license encourages owners of certain 
works to produce information that might not be produced otherwise—i.e., that their 
works are sufficiently valuable that continued copyright protection makes sense.  
b.  New-Style Formalities and Berne
This system of voluntary formalities backed with compulsory licenses raises an 
immediate question: do they comply with the Berne Convention?
The first issue is whether new-style formalities offend Berne Article 5(2)’s 
proscription of formalities that interfere with the “enjoyment and exercise” of copyright.  
There are two senses in which that phrase may be interpreted.  The first relates to the 
rightsholder’s ability to enjoy whatever economic rents his work may produce.  For the 
reasons set out above, the compulsory licenses that attend new-style formalities do not 
interfere with rightsholders’ economic expectations, at least not categorically.  Some 
authors will doubtless underestimate the future revenues that their works may bring in, 
and will mistakenly opt not to comply with formalities and expose their work to a 
compulsory license.  Of course, the possibility of mistake works both ways: some authors 
will mistakenly opt to invest in compliance with formalities for works that are unlikely to 
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produce revenues greater than the cost of compliance.  But despite the certainty that some 
authors will make the wrong decision, it is nonetheless true that authors (and assigns such 
as publishers) are the parties best placed to decide whether the likely returns from a 
particular work are great enough to merit investment in compliance with formalities.193
And in any event, if an author is uncertain regarding his work’s future value, he retains 
the option of making the relatively small investment required to comply with formalities 
as a form of insurance against incorrectly valuing his asset.
There is a second sense to the “enjoyment and exercise” of copyright, one that is 
related to, but nonetheless distinct from, the rightsholder’s economic expectations.  Under 
Article 9 of the Berne Convention, the author of a literary and/or artistic work has the 
exclusive right of authorizing the reproduction of his work “in any manner or form.”  
This includes traditional photocopying, digital copying or any other form of copying, of 
the entire work of any part thereof.  These exclusive rights include, as a necessary 
corollary, the right to refuse to authorize reproduction of a protected work.  This right to 
prohibit reproduction is tied in part to the author’s economic right: by restricting 
reproduction, the author may reduce output of his work and thereby realize 
supracompetitive returns if his work lacks ready substitutes.  
But the “enjoyment and exercise” of copyright is tied, as well, to the moral rights that 
Berne requires signatories to grant to authors.  Article 6bis of the Berne Convention 
requires member states to grant authors rights of paternity (i.e., the “right to claim 
authorship”) and integrity (i.e., the “right to object to any distortion, mutilation or other 
modification” that would prejudice the author’s reputation).194  These rights are 
independent of the author’s economic rights, survive the transfer of those economic 
rights,195 and must, in most instances, persist for at least the expiry of the economic 
rights, even following the death of the author.196
193
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It must be noted that since acceding to the Berne Convention, the United States has 
refused to fully incorporate into its domestic law the moral rights set out in Article 6bis.  
Instead, the U.S. has relied on a number of different sources, including an author’s right 
under copyright law to control derivative works, state unfair competition, defamation, 
and privacy law, and the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), a 1990 amendment to the 
copyright law granting limited rights of paternity and integrity to a narrowly-defined 
class of “works of visual art,”197 to approximate the Berne requirements.  Whether the 
U.S. currently complies with Berne Article 6bis is a subject beyond the scope of this 
article.198  But clearly current U.S. law, if it complies at all, does so only minimally.  The 
question is whether subjecting certain works to the compulsory licenses that attend new-
style formalities would subtract meaningfully from a level of protection for paternity and 
integrity rights that is already stinting.  If so, then the U.S. may fall out of compliance 
with Article 6bis (or, perhaps, make its continued noncompliance no longer tolerable).  
Some help in analyzing these questions can be found in Berne Article 9(2), which 
defines the conditions under which exceptions, such as compulsory licenses, can be made 
to the exclusive reproduction right.  Article 9(2) permits exceptions to the reproduction 
right in certain “special cases”, provided that the excepted reproduction “does not conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the author.”199
  According to the WIPO guide to the Convention, the permitted exceptions are 
subject in all cases to respect for the author’s moral rights;200 that much is evident from 
Article 9(2)’s three-step test, which mixes economic and moral rights concerns.  Berne 
197
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nations may prescribe limitations, such as a compulsory license, on a copyright owner’s 
exclusive rights only if three conditions are fulfilled, namely that: 
• the limitations concern only “special cases” and are not generalized, 
• the limitations do not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work, 
• the limitations do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. 
These criteria for restricting exclusive rights must all be met in order for restrictions 
to be permissible. 
Would the compulsory licenses involved in a system of new-style formalities pass the 
Article 9(2) test?  Whether the compulsory licenses that attend new-style formalities 
fulfill the first requirement (i.e., that the limitation may only apply in “special cases”) is 
difficult to determine with certainty.  For the reasons outlined above, we would expect a 
large number of authors to fail to comply with registration and notice requirements, and, 
similarly, the majority of rightsholders to fail to comply with a renewal formality.  
Accordingly, a large number of works (in both absolute and percentage terms) will be 
exposed to compulsory licenses in a system of new-style formalities.
That said, there is a strong argument that the type of license involved in a system of 
new-style formalities is not properly characterized as an exception or limitation to an 
author’s exclusive rights in the way an ordinary compulsory license is.  Unlike an 
ordinary compulsory license, the license involved in enforcing new-style formalities does 
not apply to any particular “class” of works, and, indeed, whether such a license applies 
at all is within the control of the rightsholder—i.e., the license only applies when the 
author or rightsholder sends a signal that he does not believe that his work has any 
significant commercial value—i.e., that he prefers the license.  The license is, in that 
sense, not properly referred to as “compulsory”.  Nonetheless, the status of new-style 
formalities under the first element of the Article 9(2) test remains unclear: although new-
style formalities lead to the application of a non-negotiated license only where 
compliance with a formality will return less than reliance on the license, the scheme does 
require all authors to affirmatively “opt in” to protection.  
  The second element, which is tied to the author’s economic right (i.e., to the 
“exploitation” of the work), is easier to analyze.  Whether an exclusive license conflicts 
with the “normal exploitation” of a work depends on the value of the work in the absence 
of the compulsory license, versus the revenues collectible under the compulsory license.  
As outlined above, the compulsory license would apply only when a rightsholder fails to 
comply with a low-cost formality.  Failure to comply is a signal that the net present value 
of expected future revenues from the work is less than the cost of compliance.  The fee 
payable under the compulsory license is set to approximate the cost of compliance.  Thus, 
for works that fall under the compulsory license, on average the rightsholder’s ability to 
“exploit” the work will be, if anything, enhanced.  
The argument that new-style formalities will not impair rightsholders’ ability to 
exploit their works finds powerful analogical support in the fair use doctrine, which often 
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has been characterized as a limitation on exclusive rights that immunizes uses for which 
the transaction costs of negotiating a license exceed the potential return to rightsholders 
from the license.201 Articles 10 and 10bis of the Berne Convention list certain fair use-
type exceptions to the exclusive reproduction right—these include limited rights to make 
quotations202 and to use works in aid of teaching203 and news reporting.204  Berne’s 
provision for fair use shows that the Convention is not indiscriminately hostile to 
exceptions to authors’ exclusive rights, but permits incursions when transaction costs 
make negotiated arrangements too costly.  The compulsory licenses that back new-style 
formalities can be supported on the same grounds.       
The third requirement—that an exempted reproduction “not unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interests of the author”—is susceptible, at least in part, to the same 
analysis.  To the extent that the author’s “legitimate interests” are taken to mean his 
ability to capture whatever rents his exclusive rights will return, the compulsory license 
does not interfere.  To the extent, however, that the phrase “legitimate interests” refers to 
the author’s moral rights, additional analysis is required.
Berne signatories are required to establish and protect paternity and integrity rights.  
Assuming that the U.S. has done so, a scheme of new-style formalities need not touch 
these rights at all: although the works of non-compliant rightsholders are subject to 
compulsory licensing, the copyrights on works affected by the regime are nonetheless left 
formally intact.  Accordingly, there is no reason why the law could not specify that use of 
works under the compulsory licenses is subject, in all cases, to whatever (narrow) 
protection current U.S. law affords to paternity and integrity rights.   
But new-style formalities could go further, in a way that would strengthen the United 
States’ commitment to facilitating the exercise of Berne-mandated moral rights.  One 
method would be to infuse into new-style formalities the type of “some rights reserved” 
copyright customization that Creative Commons provides now.205  New-style 
registration, notice, recordation of transfers, and renewal could be designed to allow 
rightsholders to signal exactly which rights they wish to retain, and which freedoms are 
allowed.  The difference is that instead of relying on a Creative Commons license, 
rightsholders’ choices about which rights to reserve would be enforceable as a matter of 
positive law.    
201
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There are two potential advantages of the integration of new-style formalities with the 
Creative Commons approach.  First, it could be used to strengthen U.S. compliance with 
Berne-mandated moral rights.  Authors who comply with new-style formalities could be 
permitted, in exchange for a blanket grant of permission to use their works, to demand 
attribution in all cases, even in instances, such as fair use, where the rightsholder would 
not currently have the power to enforce such a demand.   Similarly, authors who comply 
with new-style formalities would be able to protect their integrity rights, by permitting 
reproduction but restricting derivative uses.206
The second advantage is normative—by disaggregating economic from moral rights, 
and the moral rights of paternity and integrity from one another, new-style registration, 
notice, recordation and renewal would allow us to understand over time what people want 
in terms of rights for different types of works, and how those desires change (if they do at 
all).  That information would be useful in the debate over future changes to the copyright 
laws.
[INSERT CC GRAPHIC RE: LICENSE DISTRIBUTION]
The data set out in Figure 4, which was provided by Creative Commons, shows the 
choices that Creative Commons licensors have made over the first two years of the 
organization’s existence regarding which rights to reserve, and which to give away.  
Although rightsholders who seek out, or become informed about, Creative Commons and 
decide to enter into a Creative Commons license are certainly not representative of 
rightsholders as a broader group, the Creative Commons license distribution data gives us 
some insight into what the world might look like where copyright is no longer an on/off
switch, but is more finely variegated.
Perhaps most unexpectedly, the data show that a significant majority (67%) of 
Creative Commons licensors allow the use of their content in the creation of derivative 
works.  These data suggests that many rightsholders would voluntarily abandon control 
over derivative works, which is an element both of the author’s economic right and his 
right of integrity—although most who do so (again, 67%) would limit use to non-
commercial derivative works.
In contrast, the Creative Commons data show that almost all licensees—97%—
require attribution in exchange for permission to use their works.  That number suggests 
that the norm favoring attribution is strong, and, consequently, we may succeed in 
moving copyright closer to rightsholders’ expectations and simultaneously free a large 
amount of creative work if we install a mechanism for exchanging the right to control 
reproduction for a stronger commitment to provide attribution.
206
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works should be repelled by the fair use doctrine.  
Reform(aliz)ing Copyright Draft 03/25/04
65
IV. CONCLUSION
My initial hope, in writing this article, was that the reformalization of copyright—a 
task that could be accomplished, I believe, with a few manageable changes to the 
international and domestic law, and without endangering the interests of any particular 
segment of the copyright community—might reduce the current friction over copyright to 
a level conducive to a broader discussion about intellectual property reform.  Having 
delved further into the arguments for reformalization, and for how to do it, I retain that 
hope.  The challenge now, for those more attuned than I to political possibilities and 
limitations, is to formulate a plan for turning academic arguments for copyright 
reformalization into changes to international and domestic laws.
